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Thesis Summary
This thesis is a research and analysis project that sought to understand the energy policies
in North and South Carolina that have led to different growths of solar energy generation in the
two states. When considering the states’ proximity to each other and similar solar resources, they
should have similar numbers of installations and capacity. In national rankings of cumulative
installed solar electric capacity, however, North Carolina ranks second while South Carolina
ranks sixteenth. This suggests policy differences between the two states that have helped North
Carolina and hindered South Carolina. This project was examined from the lenses of legislation,
utility regulation, and external factors and events. Research was completed through a number of
sources including legislative and regulatory policy analysis, literature research, in-person
interviews, and archived news articles. These sources suggest that North Carolina’s solar success
over the past two decades is due to a few key, favorable policies that have spurred development:
historically generous interpretations of the federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, a
now-expired renewable energy tax credit of 35%, and a renewable portfolio standard. South
Carolina, on the other hand, has only begun to substantially grow its solar industry in the past six
or seven years. This has happened through the easing of restrictions that hindered development
as well as massive public backlash against utilities and conventional sources of electricity
generation due to a failed nuclear power plant. In the future, new policies in both states will
likely seek to ensure continued industry growth in the face of concerns about anthropogenic
climate change, economic growth, and a transition to renewable and distributed energy.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States has begun a transition from centralized,
fossil fuel-based power plants to more distributed, renewable energy generation. This transition
has been driven by steadily falling costs in technologies like solar photovoltaics and batteries,
concerns about climate change and fossil fuel pollution, and government policies designed to
guide this transition. The solar industry, in particular, has grown rapidly, spurred by falling
technology costs, flexibility for use at both residential and utility scales, and the development of
favorable policies. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the falling costs of solar photovoltaics across
industries have made solar energy cost-competitive with conventional forms of energy
production.
On a state level, much of the development of solar photovoltaics has come in states with
the most solar resources, such as California, Arizona, and Texas (Figure 3). However, not all
leaders in solar energy are large in size and located in the American Southwest. North Carolina,
New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts have all claimed positions in the “Top Ten Solar
States”, according to the Solar Energy Industries Association (Figure 4). Although those states

Figure 1: Decreases in Costs of Solar Photovoltaics (Fu, Feldman, and Margolis 2018).
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Figure 2: Levelized Costs of Electricity for Energy Technologies (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020).

Figure 3: Solar Radiation Resources of the United States (Sengupta, Xie, Lopez, Habte, Maclaurin, and Shelby 2018).

may be lacking in constant solar radiation or size, they have still managed to create successful
solar energy industries within their respective states. North Carolina, for instance, is ranked
second in the country in installed solar capacity. While North Carolina is far behind California in
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Figure 4: State Rankings of Installed Solar Capacity (“Top 10 Solar States” n.d.).

installed solar capacity, the state has more solar capacity than: Arizona, the state with perhaps
the highest average photovoltaic potential per square mile; Texas, a state with roughly five times
more land area; and Florida, also known as “The Sunshine State”.
While Georgia and Florida, two other southeastern states, also have installed solar
capacities that rank in the top 10 nationally, the American Southeast has generally not lived up to
its solar energy potential. Consider, for example, the comparison between North Carolina and its
smaller neighbor, South Carolina. The states have similar geographic profiles as they slope down
from the Blue Ridge Mountains in the west to the Atlantic Ocean in the east. The states’
proximity suggests that they share many of the same energy issues and political questions;
indeed, the major utilities present in each state are identical.
Despite their similarities, North and South Carolina vary greatly in their implementation
of solar energy and renewable energy sources in general. This can be seen clearly in Figure 5.
Although South Carolina actually has a greater solar per-unit area potential, as indicated by the
lighter yellow shading in the southern half of the state, it is at a clear disadvantage to its neighbor
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Figure 5: Solar Power Facilities in North and South Carolina (“U.S. Energy Mapping System” n.d.).

in overall numbers of solar energy facilities (marked by suns on Figure 5).
In this thesis, I examine why North Carolina, a state with less solar energy resources, has
dramatically more solar energy facilities than South Carolina. Simply taking size and population
into account does not answer that question. Rather, when considering energy industries and
production within a state, it is crucial to look at the specific policies and incentives that a state
has in place. Historically, emerging technologies like solar photovoltaics have needed incentives
from government to make them cost-competitive. As such, in order to compare the solar energy
landscapes of the two states, it is necessary to examine the policy differences that have led to
different patterns of growth in the solar energy industries of North and South Carolina. These
differences can be separated into three different categories. First is the question of how the two
legislative bodies have approached renewable energy. This can be affected by voting, special
interests and lobbying, state demographics, and a host of other factors. The second factor to
consider is the role of utility commissions in promulgating standards as well as implementing
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and regulating legislation from both the state and federal governments. Finally, it is important to
look at past events or trends that have led leaders in one state or another to favor renewable
energy over conventional forms.
In this Honors Senior Thesis, I will compare these factors in North and South Carolina
and evaluate how different policies and events have led to different solar energy progress and
industries in the two states. I first review academic literature on solar energy, energy transitions,
policy actors in energy production and regulation, and policy tools that are used to support an
energy transition. I will then evaluate the relevant federal law, such the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act and the federal investment tax credit, that have spurred solar energy investment
nationwide. Next, I will evaluate the different policies and events that have shaped North and
South Carolina’s solar industries. Finally, I will briefly discuss key differences and directly
compare the two states.
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Methodology
To compare solar policy in North and South Carolina, I first needed to know about the
solar industry in each state. While I had some background knowledge on some of the key issues
and political landscapes as a native North Carolinian and as a University of South Carolina
student, I needed to first build a foundation of knowledge for myself to build upon. Over the
summer of 2019, I served as an intern in the South Carolina Energy Office, which is an agency
housed under the state Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS). While ORS has the mission of
protecting the public interest in the regulation of utilities, the Energy Office stands as an
unbiased source of education and outreach without favoring one side over another (“Mission and
Values” n.d., “S.C. Energy Office” n.d.). As an intern in the Energy Office, I learned as much as
I could regarding the current energy landscape of South Carolina while collecting data and
information that I could use later on. I also discussed the project with a number of experts within
ORS and the Energy Office, which helped tremendously in learning about both old and new
policies.
Once back at school, one of the first research tasks I completed was a database search of
newspaper archives relating to solar in both states, using the Access World News database and
searching for articles relating to energy and solar energy in particular. For South Carolina, I
searched through archives of The State, a Columbia-based newspaper that regularly covers
energy and environmental issues. In North Carolina, I used archives of The News and Observer,
a Raleigh-based newspaper that does the same. Both newspapers are owned by The McClatchey
Co. and are located in each state’s capital city, which theoretically helped to provide equally
consistent and reliable reporting from both newspapers. By conducting this preliminary research,
I gained insight into which policies were relevant to my research as well as some of the major
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issues around those policies at the time. By reading through the archives, I was better able to
paint a mental picture of what was happening during the passage of decade-old energy laws.
Once I knew the specific pieces of legislation that I needed to do the majority of my
research on, it was time to read the laws themselves to evaluate their contents and voting records.
While I read the laws themselves thoroughly, I also read summaries and analyses of the laws
conducted by interest groups, the Energy Office, and independent third parties. By gathering
information from a variety of sources without relying solely on my own evaluations, I was able
to sort past the legal language of the laws and zero in on the key portions of each law.
Following this background research, I contacted and interviewed Sammy Fretwell, a
journalist covering the environment at The State newspaper who has covered much of the
discourse in South Carolina around climate change, renewable energy, nuclear power, and state
policy. Through interviewing him, I was better able to gain greater context around the relevant
policies, including major players and factors, contents of certain policies, and the effects of those
policies. In addition, I was able to learn some of the major areas of contention for South Carolina
laws and how interest groups sought to influence decision-making.
I also knew that many of the relevant laws left some decision-making up to the utility
commission of each state. I read through utility dockets to see what those decisions were and
what the arguments were on either side. To support this research, I watched archived footage of
legislative committee meetings and utility commission hearings; I also read transcripts and
minutes from many of those same meetings.
Because not all state government records are posted online, I also visited various libraries
to conduct additional research. To begin, I met semiregularly in the fall with Bill Sudduth, the
Head of Government Information and Maps at the University of South Carolina’s Thomas
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Cooper Library. While Thomas Cooper Library did not have the resources I needed, Mr. Sudduth
was able to point me in a number of directions and provide introductions to librarians at other
institutions. I contacted and visited the University of South Carolina School of Law’s library as
well as Davis Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. At both schools, I met
with a librarian who was willing to share with me the resources available to them. In addition, I
visited the North Carolina Legislative Library to access records from some of the state’s older
energy laws.
Once I had all of the information I needed from a variety of sources, I compiled it and
started to create a narrative outline on the energy laws, regulations, and overall landscapes for
each state. Soon after that, I began to write. The figures and data I have compiled and displayed
come from a variety of sources, including utility dockets, legislative records, the South Carolina
Energy Office, the federal Energy Information Administration, and the Solar Energy Industries
Association.
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A Background on Solar Energy
During the past two decades, the world has begun a slow transition to safer and cleaner
energy sources. In the face of anthropogenic climate change, renewable energy sources have
become increasingly popular as low carbon modes of electricity generation. While there are
many different renewable energy technologies on the market that are more or less suitable for
different climates and locations, one of the most popular technologies is solar energy. While the
term “solar energy” encompasses all power and heat produced by solar radiation, solar electricity
production is generally divided into two different technologies: photovoltaics – also known as
solar panels – and concentrated solar power. In this literature review, I will focus on
photovoltaics because of their greater usage and implementation in North and South Carolina;
concentrated solar power is currently undeveloped in both states. In the following sections, I
begin with a brief history of photovoltaics in the energy industry, both globally and in the United
States. I then turn to evaluate the energy transition currently going on within the United States
before examining the different policy tools used to achieve a clean energy transition.
Historical Context
The first photovoltaic solar module was made commercially available in the mid-1950s
and was characterized by very low efficiency and low durability (Green 2005). Over the next two
decades, solar panels improved incrementally, though they were used primarily for space
missions and satellites. However, in the early 1970s, a jump in efficiency immediately preceded
an increased interest in terrestrial applications (Green 2005). This interest was largely rooted in
the quest for alternative sources of energy during the oil crises of the 1970s. In 1979, Democratic
President Jimmy Carter erected solar panels on the White House as a symbol of increasing
energy independence from foreign sources. While these panels functioned only as water heaters,
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they served as a reminder of American energy independence until President Ronald Reagan, a
Republican, removed them in 1981. After the optimism around energy efficiency and greater
energy independence under Carter, Reagan’s two terms in office marked an era of policy
retrenchment – especially in the environmental and renewable energy sector (Karapin 2020).
Under Reagan, federal funding for R&D of renewable energy fell quickly, and more emphasis
was placed on cheaper fossil fuels.
In the years following Reagan’s presidency, climate change began to emerge on the
national radar. At the same time, increased polarization over environmental issues quickly
engulfed climate policy. While President George H.W. Bush initially supported a federal climate
policy in the early 1990s, resistance from business and party leadership caused his administration
to retreat (Karapin 2020). Despite this backtrack, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 did include
some federal government support for renewable energy development and integrated resource
planning – planning out future capacity acquisitions – within the states (H.R. 776). After a period
of little progress during the Clinton Administration, the two terms of President George W. Bush
continued to see little federal action on renewable energy policy. Bush – a Texas native – was
especially responsive to fossil fuel interests. While his administration was notable for its inaction
on climate issues, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 did include some concessions to renewable
energy policy, such as the increase in the investment tax credit for solar energy – a policy that
will be discussed in subsequent sections (H.R. 6).
During President Barack Obama’s administration, attempts to support the expansion of
renewable energy or to address climate change at the federal level were repeatedly stymied by
increasingly polarized parties and the effects of the Great Recession. In an effort to address this
economic crash, the Obama administration did pass the American Recovery and Reinvestment
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Act in 2009 – a comprehensive law and stimulus package that included massive funds allocated
for investment in grid modernization, solar energy research, and energy efficiency (H.R. 1,
United States Environmental Protection Agency 2009).
In general, however, the Clinton, second Bush, and Obama administrations were marked
by relative inaction on climate change or renewable energy. Because of this, many states began
to take matters into their own hands by implementing renewable portfolio standards – laws
requiring that a certain percentage of electricity generation come from renewable sources – and
other policies ensuring and incentivizing renewable energy development. While federal tax
credits were extended multiple times and coincided with drops in the cost of photovoltaics,
Congress also began the process of phasing out the investment tax credits near the end of the
Obama administration (Karapin 2020). The credits are currently being phased out with the
expiration of the residential credit occurring in 2022.
While President Obama – a Democrat – entered the Paris Climate Agreement and
introduced the Clean Power Plan via executive order, his renewable energy policies were largely
rolled back by President Donald Trump – a Republican – upon his election in 2016. With a profossil fuel industry and anti-environmental regulation stance, President Trump has undermined
much of the renewable energy progress made at the federal level. As part of a trade war with
China, the Trump administration announced a 30% tariff on imported solar panels, which could
lead to an increase in future installation costs of photovoltaics (Karapin 2020).
Because of the dual-party system currently in place in the United States, one party can
take control of all federal branches of government and pass their own energy laws (or roll back
previous policies). This has been seen in many presidential administrations in the past few
decades – most notably in the transitions from Carter to Reagan and from Obama to Trump.

16
Because of this system, increasing party polarization, geographic variability, and general
disagreement over environmental and climate issues, it has been difficult for the federal
government to put together any comprehensive renewable energy policy (Karapin 2020).
At the federal level, the primary driver of solar energy growth has been federal tax
policy in addition to the aforementioned R&D support for solar developers. However, due to a
lack of other federal actions on renewable energy and climate change, much of the progress in
renewable energy industries has been at the state levels. With the historical context of solar
energy technologies and renewable energy in general in mind, it is easy to see how the United
States’ energy transition has been slower than transitions in other countries.
Worldwide, the transition to renewable energy has been driven by various climate treaties
and unilateral national action, especially in the European Union. In countries such as Germany, a
leader in solar energy, national policies and climate change mitigation plans have been used to
make renewable energy more economically viable (Karapin 2020). In the United States,
however, there is no national target or climate plan designed to bring renewable energy to greater
prominence. Other than various federal tax credits and funding for renewable energy
technologies, the majority of renewable energy policy has been enacted by states (Karapin 2020).
This has happened largely because of the country’s federalist system and large, variable
geographic area compared to European countries. Each state has its own priorities as well as its
own resources, so much of the renewable energy development in the country has occurred in
states that are particularly rich in a certain resource, such as solar radiation (see Figure 3). Much
of the pushback against federal climate policy has emerged from this geographic variability –
while one state may easily transition from conventional fuels to renewable energy in an effort to
reduce emissions, another state may lack the same resources.
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As a result of federal inaction, many states have stepped up to fill the void and implement
their own renewable energy policies, some of which are discussed in subsequent sections. In
many states, major oil crises helped to drive omnibus energy legislation like renewable portfolio
standards. While some bills may have been intended for specific energy sources at the time, they
have opened the door for renewable energy, and especially solar, as costs have decreased
(Barbose et al. 2019).
Despite relatively little federal action on renewable energy, public support for solar
energy is high. A 2015 study found that the American public generally supports the development
of utility-scale solar installations (Carlisle et al. 2015), a finding that is supported by recent
polling data that finds an estimated 80% of Americans favor greater emphasis on solar energy
(McCarthy 2019). This apparent disconnect between public opinion and federal action is perhaps
the best illustration of the influence large utilities and the fossil fuel industry have on legislation
(Karapin 2020).
Policy Actors
To begin to understand the legislative and regulatory landscape for energy policy in the
U.S., it is important to first understand the actors at play. Different scales of policy all come into
play, since global events, agreements, and markets can impact energy policy within a single state
or industry.
One important distinction to make is between the external (international) and internal
(intranational) sides of energy policy (Prontera 2009). Major political actors of the external
energy economy act at the international level. National governments, as well as international
corporations, play a major role in international energy politics due to the production and trade of
energy sources - especially fossil fuels (Prontera 2009). Because larger issues of energy are ones
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of supply and demand as well as general foreign policy, national governments play a crucial role
in ensuring that each country’s energy needs are met. This can be seen most prominently in the
Arab oil embargoes that occurred in the 1970s. While the motivating factors were not related to
energy, the resulting oil scares changed American views on oil availability and dependence on
foreign sources (Camp 2019). International treaties, such as the Paris Climate Accords, also are a
form of external energy policy.
Internal energy policy differs in several ways. First, internal energy policy involves a
different set of actors, including federal and state governments, utilities and energy producers,
engineers and experts, industry associations, and environmentalists (Prontera 2009). Each of
these categories can be further divided. For example, utilities and energy producers include fossil
fuel industries, investor-owned utilities, electric cooperatives, and renewable energy industries
(Downie 2017). Each of those actors have different priorities, and those divisions come into play
within the legislative and regulatory spheres of energy policy. In this era of anthropogenic
climate change, environmentalists are an important category of actors. Environmental groups are
among the most vocal advocates of clean electricity generation, and they often hold utilities and
other energy producers accountable for environmental damages or protection (Doblinger and
Soppe 2013). Environmental accidents caused by energy production – such as the Chernobyl or
Fukushima nuclear accidents – and concerns about climate change have resulted in greater
advocacy against conventional energy technologies (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). In addition,
environmental groups strategize to convince lawmakers of the benefits of new, cleaner
technologies. Although environmental groups, utilities, and legislatures are often portrayed as
adversaries, they often work in collaboration with utilities and other special interest groups to
help adopt different technologies with lower risk (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). For example, a
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utility in Colorado suffered from a poor environmental reputation due to its reliance on coal;
however, an alliance with environmentalists helped to provide the credibility needed to
commercialize wind technologies (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). While previous research and the
media have highlighted an adversarial relationship between environmental groups and utilities,
governments, and other groups, the reality is that they often work in harmony to compromise on
key issues and policies. In this thesis, I primarily focus on the policy tools used by internal policy
actors.
Policy Tools
There are several different policy tools that have been used in efforts to promote methods
of renewable energy production such as solar photovoltaics. All of these tools have been used to
some degree and in combination by the federal government, state governments, or both.
Tax Credits
The federal investment tax credit (ITC) seeks to address a problem that any technology
has in its beginning stages: cost. The ITC serves as a tax credit for investors in solar property.
Generally, a tax credit is a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in the income taxes that a person or
company would otherwise pay the federal government” (“Solar Investment Tax Credit [ITC]”
n.d.). In the case of the ITC, the tax credit can be claimed if the investor purchases an eligible
solar energy system and installs it. These investors can be residential customers, businesses, or
utilities. In the United States, the ITC for solar was created along with an ITC for wind in 1978
(Karapin 2020). While the solar ITC equaled a credit of only 10%, it survived the Reagan era of
policy retrenchment – unlike the credit for wind energy. The solar ITC was solidified and made
permanent by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (H.R. 776). Despite the progress made, the federal
government went over a decade before establishing further domestic energy legislation with the

20
Energy Policy Act of 2005. While President Bush received criticism for favoring the fossil fuel
and nuclear industries, the 2005 Act did expand the federal ITC to a credit of 30% (H.R. 6,
Stokes and Breetz 2018). The credit was only meant to last for another two years with a sunset
provision, but it has subsequently been extended multiple times. The expiration of the credit is
currently set for the end of 2021 as the federal government begins to phase it out.
In addition to the federal ITC, many states also have supplemental tax credits of varying
sizes. By 2009, according to a 2012 study, 46 states had implemented tax credits for solar
technology of some type (Sarzynski, Larrieu, and Shrimali 2012). While some states have made
the decision to phase out those tax credits, many states still offer one for renewable energy. With
combined federal and state tax credits, the up-front cost of solar photovoltaics for a homeowner
or business can be greatly reduced.
Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are among the most prevalent renewable energy
policies at the state level in the United States. An RPS is a policy instrument that generally
mandates “that a certain percentage or amount of electricity within a state must be generated
from renewable sources such as wind, solar, geothermal or biomass” (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty,
and Miller 2017). For the majority of states, this mandate is graduated over time so that certain
portions of the standard are met in the years before a final deadline. For some states, however,
this policy may serve only as a goal rather than a mandate. According to the US Energy
Information Administration, 37 states have adopted some form of an RPS policy (either
voluntary or mandated), and 29 of those policies are mandated (Figure 6). While different states
have adopted different standards, RPS policies in general have become more popular as more
states adopt climate action plans and renewable energy.
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Figure 6: Map of State Renewable Energy Standards and Goals (“Detailed Summary Maps” 2019).

Interestingly, the spread of RPS policies has been fairly widespread; the contents of the
policies, however, have been inconsistent. A study in 2017 found that the mere adoption of an
RPS by one state is influenced by its neighbors (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller 2017). For
example, a state considering an RPS policy might look to its geographic neighbors and see if
they have adopted one. If so, the state might examine the effectiveness of the standard as a
whole; if the policy works, the first state might adopt one as well. However, the contents of the
RPS policy may vary. The same study found that the actual contents of an RPS policy in one
state (i.e., its target percentages and dates) are actually more similar to the contents of RPS
policies found in ideologically similar states – even if they are across the country from one
another (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller 2017). Given that conservatives are historically
more likely to favor the fossil fuel industry, this makes sense: conservative states generally have
RPS policies that are less ambitious or even voluntary, while left-leaning states generally have
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more ambitious mandates.
A major part of many states’ RPS policies is the renewable energy certificate, or REC,
system in which utilities are required or given the option to purchase RECs. RECs are “tradable
credit[s] for each megawatt-hour (MWh) of generation that is sold separately from the electricity
a system generates” (Gaul and Carley 2012). In essence, the REC shows a state that a utility has
purchased renewable energy over a fixed term. Since many states’ RPS policies include a socalled ‘solar set-aside’ – a policy that mandates a certain percentage of the standard be met by
solar power – utilities must also purchase solar renewable energy credits (SRECs). In many
states along the eastern seaboard, SREC transactions have served as a primary mechanism for
growth; however, some states place limits on what kinds of transactions occur. For example,
North Carolina’s RPS policy, passed in 2007, states that utilities can satisfy their requirements by
purchasing RECs (N.C. S. 3). While it is possible to purchase RECs from out-of-state in case of
lower costs, North Carolina requires that only 25% of utility RECs can be met in this way. The
line of thinking behind this is that by limiting how many RECs can come from out-of-state, the
state of North Carolina could begin to build its own solar market rather than depending on that of
other states.
Net Metering
A major way for states to make solar power more cost-effective for homeowners is
through net metering, a mechanism that “forces utility companies to pay customers that create
their own electricity the same amount of money as they charge customers per megawatt”
(Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008). Net metering was legal in a number of states prior to 2005,
but the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that each state utility commission would at least
consider the implementation of net metering (H.R. 6). A common example of net metering in
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practice is residential solar energy. If a homeowner puts solar panels on their roof and enters an
interconnection agreement with their utility, then the utility must pay them – now referred to as a
customer-generator – for any excess power that the panels push back onto the grid. States make
net metering legal for a number of reasons. The first is that it can help diversify the state’s
energy supply through distributed generation (Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008). Additionally,
net metering can satisfy citizens who advocate for renewable energy or feel that their utility is
taking advantage of them. In states where utilities hold a lot of political power, customers feel
that net metering can provide them greater freedom in their energy usage. Finally, net metering
can help make residential photovoltaics more affordable by helping to pay for themselves. While
solar panel installations altogether cost thousands of dollars, net metering can help reduce the
payback time by a number of years (Imteaz and Ahsan 2018).
Of course, the value of net metering depends on perspective. For utilities, the idea of a
“utility death spiral” is often cited. In this scenario, customers with solar photovoltaics on their
roof will be using less energy from the utility and therefore paying less each month to the utility.
This creates a positive feedback loop in which the utility increases rates for its regular customers
to pick up the slack, which then leads to a greater number of customers dissatisfied with the
utility and defecting from the grid (Laws et al. 2017). Because of the disconnect between utility
profits and the desires of customers, it is easy to see why utilities fight to stop or reduce net
metering programs across the United States. The given definition of net metering describes how
utilities are forced to pay customers at full retail rate; however, that is not the case in many states
across America. A 2017 study found that while many utilities across America may ambiguously
advertise full (retail) net metering rates under their programs, very few in practice actually
compensate their net metering customers in this way (Schelly, Louie, and Pearce 2017).
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Community Solar
Net metering often leaves customers satisfied but the utilities dissatisfied, while no net
metering leaves a utility satisfied but a customer dissatisfied. Because of this disconnect, a
common middle ground between utilities and customers - community solar - is desirable. In a
community solar program, multiple customers can buy into “PV projects ranging from a few
hundred kW to a few MW on the distribution grid (i.e., non-customer-sited) administered by the
utility or a third-party entity” (Funkhouser et al. 2015). Community solar programs are often
advertised as a way for customers to purchase renewable energy even if they are unable to enter
a net metering arrangement or if their roof may be incompatible with rooftop solar. Other
participants in community solar may be renters, live in multi-family homes, or are unable to
afford the upfront costs of solar. Regardless of the reason, a community solar program enables a
utility to provide renewable energy to customers while maintaining the traditional relationship
between them. By offering a community solar program, utilities can avoid some of the inherent
inequities that arise from net metering and rooftop solar. Additionally, community solar
programs can help to address regulatory requirements such as RPS policies.

25
Federal Legislation and PURPA
Under a framework of cooperative federalism, and given the federal government’s recent
inability to pass a comprehensive energy or climate law, the onus of energy legislation has
largely fallen upon individual states. As discussed above, recent federal legislation has primarily
addressed renewable energy by providing tax credits as well as research grants and funding.
Even those federal energy laws that have endured over the past five decades typically give some
form of primacy, or regulatory responsibility, to the states. This is most evident in the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 (H.R. 4018).
PURPA helped to build a niche for renewable energy in the electricity market. Signed
into law by President Carter, the law was passed in part as a response to the oil crises of the
1970s and was part of a series of energy efficiency and production laws passed during the Carter
administration. PURPA was meant to promote energy conservation and greater use of domestic
energy and renewable energy. The introduction of new generation was to be achieved through
the designation of a new class of energy producers: Qualifying Facilities (QFs). QFs are small,
independently owned production facilities that produce electricity from wind, solar, biomass,
cogeneration, and other sources. Under PURPA, utilities – which previously could pick and
choose where to source energy – are required to purchase the electricity produced from QFs at
the so-called “avoided cost”, which is the cost to the utility “which, but for the purchase from
such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another
source” (H.R. 4018). Avoided cost rates and contract terms (i.e., contract length) are set by state
utility commissions, which leads to great variation across states in the numbers and types of QFs
approved and constructed.
State commissions establish a utility’s “standard offer” for QFs by which the contract
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length and rate are set. For example, a standard offer might contract for electricity at $0.05 per
kilowatt-hour for 10 years. The length and rate of utility standard offers that are set by state
commissions are vital to the financial viability of renewable projects, since they provide some
certainty that allows banks and investors to see how and when the money borrowed to construct
a facility will be repaid. Because of this, states that promulgate low rates and/or short contracts
generally will not have as many QFs as a state that promulgates high rates and/or long contracts
as part of utilities’ standard offers. In short, it makes little financial sense for a third party to
build a solar farm if the contract given by the utility is insufficient to reap a profit.
While differences in PURPA implementation are certainly a key factor that can be seen
when comparing the solar industries in North and South Carolina, they are not the only factor. As
shown in the literature review, many different policy tools can be effective in making certain
types of energy production, such as solar photovoltaics, financially viable. Differences in
PURPA implementation also do little to explain the difference between the spread of residential
and utility scale solar installations. In the following sections, I will describe and evaluate the
different policy tools, ideologies, and motivations that the two states have utilized and
considered over the last few decades.
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Solar Energy in North Carolina
Background
State Politics
When it comes to presidential elections, North Carolina is considered a swing state – one
that has no real tendency to vote one party over another. While this may be true on a national
stage, this has an interesting effect on intra-state politics. Most of the state’s Democrats live in
the urban districts surrounding cities like Charlotte, the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill region
known as the Research Triangle, and Winston-Salem. In the rural districts, Republicans
dominate polling (Figure 7). Although the numbers of voters registered to each party in the state
are similar, Republicans tend to dominate the state legislature – also known as the General
Assembly – due to districts that were created as a result of gerrymandering (Wines and Fausset
2019). Gubernatorial races, on the other hand, have not relied on districts. This consistent
conflict in ideologies between the General Assembly and the Governor has led to a state where
issues are hotly contested, but ultimately both parties must work together in creating policy.
In 2013, however, the balance of power in state government shifted. A Republican, Pat
McCrory, was elected as governor for the first time since 1993. In addition, the Republican Party
took complete control of the General Assembly- giving the party complete control of state
government for the first time since Reconstruction. As a pro-business government, the McCrory
administration and the General Assembly often favored utilities like Duke Energy in decisionmaking, which gave those same utilities enormous influence within state government. A possible
explanation for this preferential treatment is that Governor McCrory was a former 28-year
employee of Duke Energy Corporation before his term as governor- a fact often used in
accusations that his administration favored the utility giant (The Editorial Board 2014).
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Figure 7: County Voting Records in the 2016 Presidential Election (“2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Results by State and
County.” n.d.).

In 2016, after a hotly contested election, Democrat Roy Cooper won the gubernatorial
race over the incumbent McCrory. Since winning the election, Governor Cooper has started to
push back against utilities’ political power. Although not directly related to energy issues,
Governor Cooper had a large majority of his vetoes over his first two years overridden – another
sign of conflicts between the Republican supermajority in the General Assembly and his
position. In the 2018 elections, however, Republicans lost a number of seats and their
supermajority.
Energy Statistics
North Carolina is in an interesting location for electricity generation. Despite not ranking
high among the United States’ largest states by area or population, it still ranks in the top 10
nationally in electricity generation (“North Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019). A major
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contributor to this statistic comes from the state’s location. North Carolina experiences both cold
winters and hot summers, which leads to high electricity demand in both winter and summer due
to heating and cooling, respectively. Consequently, this high demand for energy requires a high
base load of energy- one that is provided in large part by nuclear power and natural gas (“North
Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019).
While there are a number of municipal utilities and electric cooperatives in the state,
electricity is mostly provided by two large investor-owned utilities: Duke Energy Corporation
and Dominion Energy (Figure 8). Duke Energy Corporation, headquartered in Charlotte, North
Carolina, is composed of Duke Energy Carolinas – its original territory – and Duke Energy
Progress. The latter was added to Duke’s service area as a result of its merger with Progress
Energy in 2012 that made it the largest utility in America at the time (“Merger of Progress
Energy and Duke Energy Created Largest U.S. Electric Utility.” 2012). Because Duke Energy

Figure 8: Investor-Owned Utility Coverage Map (“Maps” n.d.).
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Figure 9: Annual Solar Installations in North Carolina (“North Carolina Solar” n.d.).

Corporation employs thousands of North Carolinians and has a massive impact on the state’s
economy, it wields a tremendous amount of political and economic influence within the state.
North Carolina may not seem like a leader in renewable energy when compared to states
like California or Texas, but the state has the second-most installed solar power generating
capacity in the country (see Figure 4). Over the course of the past two decades, the state has
experienced an explosive growth in both numbers of installations and capacity that has led to the
state’s status as a national leader (Figure 9). Although this success has come mostly from state
policies and regulations, the support of the general public has also been important to increasing
renewable energy capacity and availability for citizens. Recent polling has suggested that the
vast majority of North Carolinians would support a candidate that would support policies
encouraging renewable energy options like wind turbines and solar photovoltaics (“Emerging
Energy Issues and North Carolina Trends.” 2019). Although that strong majority holds across
political parties, Democrats are more likely to support such a candidate than Republicans.
Although many citizens support renewable energy because of environmental and climate issues,
one poll concludes, the majority of support comes from economics and free-market choices.
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Government Action
PURPA Regulations
As previously mentioned, with the passage of PURPA in 1978 states were required to
determine the size of QFs, calculate avoided cost rates, and determine standard contract terms. In
1984, just a few years after the passage of PURPA, the North Carolina Utilities Commission
(NCUC) set that QFs of 5 MW or less would be guaranteed a standard contract for 15 years at an
avoided cost rate that would be set every two years by the NCUC (Sanders, 2017). At the time
these rules were established, the likely beneficiary was thought to be small hydropower facilities.
However, this decision set the framework for the wave of solar facilities that would come a few
decades later when further renewable energy policies were implemented (NC Solar Now 2016).
Even though the NCUC decided to re-set avoided cost rates for utilities every two years, the rates
have generally remained favorable to solar developers over the following decades.
Tax Credits
In addition to federal tax credits that were passed by the Carter Administration, many
states within the United States also passed laws meant to encourage energy conservation. North
Carolina passed its Energy Conservation Act of 1977 with the purpose, in part, to “promote and
encourage the conservation of energy by providing a tax credit for installation of solar hot water,
heating and cooling systems” (“Guidelines for Determining the Tax Credit for Investing in
Renewable Energy Property” 2014). By encouraging the production of renewable sources of
energy, the tax credit would help to conserve nonrenewable sources. At that time, the 25% tax
credit was available for solar heating and cooling only; photovoltaic technology was not
advanced enough at that time for mass production. It did, however, set the stage for tax credits to
serve as an effective policy tool.
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In 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly repealed various income tax credits
related to energy and reassembled them into a single credit for investing in renewable energy
property (N.C. H.B. 1472, “Guidelines for Determining the Tax Credit for Investing in
Renewable Energy Property” 2014). The new tax credit defined renewable energy as including
“solar energy equipment that uses solar radiation as a substitute for traditional energy for […]
generating electricity”. Unlike the 25% tax credit put in place in 1977, this credit would reduce
the cost of solar power systems by 35% and included solar photovoltaics, which were rapidly
becoming more cost-effective and economically viable. This was particularly the case when the
35% state tax credit was combined with the 30% federal investment tax credit, which together
could reduce the upfront price of a solar photovoltaic system by 65%.
Despite this discount, the widespread implementation of photovoltaic systems in North
Carolina was at first limited for a couple of reasons. The first was that solar panels were still too
inefficient and expensive for widespread use. Second, at the time of passage the external
motivator of climate change – which could incentivize people to purchase solar panels – was not
considered as urgent as it is today.
However, as the solar industry became better established in North Carolina and as the
prices of solar photovoltaic systems kept falling, the state tax credit was used more and more
frequently. In the 2010s, the years-old policies began to lead to something of a solar boom in the
state. By the mid-2010s, lawmakers began to suggest that the tax credit was no longer needed for
solar installations to become cost-effective. Finally, in 2015, Governor McCrory signed Senate
Bill 372, which created an expiration of the state tax credit on January 1, 2017 (N.C. S. 372).
While a lag period was included to allow time for pending applications to be processed, this
expiration was a sign of a new energy landscape in North Carolina – one in which renewable
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energy was starting to be competitive with conventional sources of electricity generation.
The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard
A favorable tax situation alone likely would not have driven the solar boom in North
Carolina. In the late 90s and early 2000s many states began to implement renewable energy
policies other than tax incentives in earnest. Renewable portfolio standards in particular became
popular, as shown by the 37 state-level standards that are in place today across the United States
(see Figure 6). In 2007, North Carolina’s General Assembly passed a Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS) in Senate Bill 3 – making it the first and only state
in the southeastern US to have passed a renewable portfolio standard with mandatory targets
(N.C. S. 3). The stated goal of the law is to “promote the development of renewable energy and
energy efficiency” by doing the following:
1. Diversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs of consumers in the
State.
2. Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous energy resources
available within the State.
3. Encourage private investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.
4. Provide improved air quality and other benefits to energy consumers and citizens of
the State.
To achieve these stated goals, S.3 Section 2.(a) required that public utilities begin adding a
certain percentage of renewable energy into their retail electricity sales for given target years. In
North Carolina, these targets were: for 2012, 3% of 2011 retail sales; for 2015, 6% of 2014 sales;
for 2018, 10% of 2017 sales; and for 2021, 12.5% of 2020. Interestingly, the definition of
“renewable energy” in this bill did not include nuclear power as a renewable source of
electricity, despite its carbon-free production. Additionally, Section 2.(a) contains a “solar setaside”, a provision that requires that some portion of the total utility requirements come
specifically from solar power. These solar targets were for percentages of total retail electricity:
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0.02% by 2010, 0.07% by 2012, 0.14% by 2015, and 0.2% by 2018 (N.C. S. 3). For utilities
required to meet the general requirements, the legislature offered the following methods, among
others:
1. Generate electric power at a new renewable energy facility.
2. Purchase electric power from a new renewable energy facility, which can be in-state
or out-of-state (with conditions).
3. Purchase renewable energy certificates derived from in-State or out-of-state new
renewable energy facilities. Only 25% of the certificates bought to meet this
requirement can be located out-of-state.
For the purposes of solar power, these are the primary methods to be concerned with, although
other methods – such as reducing electric generation through improvements in efficiency – are
offered as well. The first is fairly straightforward: utilities can generate electric power at a new
renewable energy facility. The second and third are similar in that they describe electric power
purchased from new renewable energy facilities; however, utilities can either purchase the power
directly from a third-party producer via their standard offer or purchase a renewable energy
certificate to show that they have purchased the electricity from elsewhere. The bill, however, is
clear that only 25% of the state’s requirements could be fulfilled via the purchase of out-of-state
renewable energy certificates.
The implementation of the REPS in North Carolina was vital to the growth of a solar
industry in North Carolina because, for the first time, utilities were required by the state to
produce or purchase power from a renewable source. At the time of the REPS’ passage,
lawmakers had wind energy or biofuels in mind when thinking of renewable energy, as few had
foreseen the rapid decrease in the prices of solar PV systems. When falling prices of solar
systems were combined with the REPS, North Carolina’s generous contract terms under PURPA,
and strong tax credits, solar power began to expand rapidly in the state. With all of these
favorable policies combined, it is little surprise that by 2016 North Carolina had more PURPA-
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Figure 10: Utility-scale Solar PV Capacity as of 2015 (Sukunta 2016).

qualifying solar facilities than any other state in the United States – despite being dwarfed by
California in the overall number of solar facilities (Figure 10). The vast majority of solar
installations in North Carolina have been at the utility scale, indicating that utility requirements
from the REPS and PURPA have been vital to the growth of the solar industry within the state.
As the solar industry in North Carolina began to boom, lawmakers and utilities began to have
serious talks about the future of energy production in the state.
Competitive Energy Solutions for NC
As third-party solar farms began flourishing in the early 2010s under North Carolina’s
generous laws, utilities in the state began to lobby for less generous conditions. Because the
PURPA-mandated avoided cost rates and contract conditions set by the NCUC had historically
been favorable to the solar industry, investor-owned utilities in the state – and especially Duke
Energy – preferred shorter terms and smaller QFs. However, environmental groups, the solar
industry, and many lawmakers sought to continue the rapid growth of the state solar industry and
touted the jobs it created. Out of this debate, and after a nine-month-long negotiation process,
emerged 2017’s House Bill 589 (N.C. H.B. 589). While this act came as the result of negotiation
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and left no party fully satisfied, it helped to ensure that the state’s solar industry could continue
to grow.
While there are many parts to the legislation, most of them dealt directly with the solar
energy industry and utility structure within the state. The first change, under Section 1.(b), was to
adjust the state’s interpretation of PURPA. Under HB 589, utilities are now only required by
PURPA to purchase power from qualifying facilities less than 1 MW in size for contracts of 10
years or less. Previously, these contracts were for facilities less than 5 MW in size and for
contracts of up to 15 years. Additionally, once the utility purchases 100 MW of capacity from
these facilities, the contracts will become available only to producers under 100 KW in size.
With the addition of this provision, the rate of expansion of QFs in the state under PURPA has
dramatically slowed.
The second change mandated by H.B. 589, under Section 2.(a), was that any facilities
larger than 1 MW would be subject to a competitive bidding process, with each utility required
to purchase a total of 2,660 MW over a 45-month period. While the utilities themselves could
build their own facilities to meet the 2,660 MW target, those facilities could count for only 30%
of the competitive procurement requirement. Through the addition of this change, utilities
became more able to pick projects that would likely be more suitable for reliability standards and
to result in lower rates. In short, two provisions of H.B. 589 marked a turning point in the solar
industry of North Carolina, as they gave utilities greater control of solar energy production. By
reducing PURPA’s influence in the state and creating a more competitive market, H.B. 589
incidentally showed that solar energy was ready to become competitive with traditional energy
sources.
Once the utilities achieved their goal of reducing PURPA’s influence, the solar industry
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also needed to make similar gains. One major way that could happen was through expanding
residential solar. Part VI of H.B. 589, the Distributed Resources Access Act, contains a number
of points intended to make renewable energy more accessible to individual utility customers.
First, the Act directs utilities to revise their net metering rates to ensure that residents could not
benefit off multiple subsidies for renewable energy. This is based on the idea of crosssubsidization – a negative situation in which non-participating customers see an increase in their
bills to pay for the returns given to net-metering customers. Second, the Act authorizes solar
leasing in the state of North Carolina- a move that makes solar power more accessible and
affordable for homeowners, especially after the expiration of the state tax credit. By allowing
third parties to lease solar panels to homeowners, businesses, and municipalities, H.B. 589
removes the large up-front cost of installations and allows for the expansion of leasing programs
that have been successful in places like California. For North Carolinians who could not access
solar energy for some reason, H.B. 589 also mandated that each utility create a community solar
program for its retail customers to participate in. Many residents of North Carolina do not own
their residence or live somewhere unsuitable for rooftop solar energy, but community solar
programs allow them to still participate in renewable energy.
Another provision of H.B. 589, Section VIII, directed large utilities in the state (i.e.,
Duke Energy and Dominion Energy) to create limited rebate programs for customer-sited solar
installations (owned or leased) with set-asides for residential, non-profit, and school installations.
Once again, this rebate program was intended to help make small solar installations more
affordable for utility customers. While the rebates do nothing to reduce upfront costs of
installation, they incrementally help the customers save money on the electricity they purchase
from the utility and therefore shorten the payback period from the installation of solar panels.
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The final version of H.B. 589 was the result of a months-long negotiation process
between groups of diverse stakeholders, and it shows a compromise. While it includes provisions
to help utilities by reducing PURPA’s influence, it also helps individual customers to access
solar energy and ensures continued growth of the solar industry within the state. Based on the
provisions of HB 589, North Carolina is estimated to have a total of 6.8 gigawatts of installed
solar capacity by 2022 in addition to added jobs and investment within the state.
Net Metering
Most of North Carolina’s early progress on solar energy installations came in the form of
utility-scale QFs, so residential solar installations were largely overlooked by state legislation
until H.B. 589 in 2017. North Carolina still had net metering policies, but they came at the
direction of the NCUC.
In 1998, years before the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required commissions to consider
net metering policies, the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association (NCSEA) presented
before the NCUC and asked them to consider adopting a net metering requirement for utilities.
Shortly following that presentation, the NCUC issued an order for an investigation into the
proposed rule (North Carolina Utilities Commission 1998). About a year later – once all
interested parties were brought in – the NCUC scheduled public hearings regarding the proposed
rule (North Carolina Utilities Commission 1999). Following these public hearings, Carolina
Power and Light Company and Duke Energy Corp. adopted experimental/pilot photovoltaic rate
riders that would be available to a maximum of twenty-five customers on a first-come, firstserved basis.
In 2005, after a few years of experimental rate riders, the NCSEA filed a letter to the
NCUC asking them to resume considering a net metering policy. After some consideration, the
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NCUC issued an order adopting net metering in the state (North Carolina Utilities Commission
2005). The original policy allowed for renewable energy facilities up to 20 kW of capacity for a
residential customer and up to 100 kW for a non-residential customer. In addition, net metering
was offered to customers on a first-come, first-serve basis “up to an aggregate limit of 0.2% of
the utility's North Carolina jurisdictional retail peak load for the previous year”. Interestingly, the
issue of cross-subsidization was brought up even in 2005. However, the parties involved at the
time felt that it would be a very minor issue due to the small scale of net metering arrangements.
In fact, in 2009 the NCUC noted that examples of cross-subsidization did exist within the state,
but that they felt the costs were outweighed by other policy benefits (North Carolina Utilities
Commission 2009).
Following the passage of S. 3 in 2007, the NCUC felt that it was necessary to revisit net
metering arrangements in order to maintain consistency with the new renewable portfolio
standard. After lengthy consideration, the NCUC issued a 2009 order containing a couple of
revisions (North Carolina Utilities Commission 2009). The first was a simple change in
definitions to match the definitions contained in SB 3. The second regarded the limits on net
metering imposed by the NCUC in their original decision. In this new decision, the NCUC
concluded that it was “in the public interest to allow larger customer-generators up to and
including 1 MW in size to net meter and that it is not necessary to continue to impose any
aggregate limit on net metering” (North Carolina Utilities Commission 2009). By removing
some of the restrictions, the NCUC felt that the goals mandated by the REPS would be more
easily met.
Following that decision, there were no policy changes from the NCUC regarding net
metering until the passage of HB 589 in 2017, although there was discussion in 2014 when the
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NCSEA sought to ensure a mandatory ten-year extension of net metering rates (North Carolina
Sustainable Energy Association 2014). This was spurred by both public and private comments
made by Duke Energy executives indicating an intent to reduce net metering credits. The motion
by NCSEA was denied, but the outpouring of customer support for the current net metering rules
that came as a result showed the popularity of those rules.
Executive Order 80
In 2018, in response to a growing demand for governmental climate action, North
Carolina Governor Roy Cooper issued Executive Order 80: North Carolina’s Commitment to
Address Climate Change and Transition to a Clean Energy Economy (Cooper 2018). As part of
this order, the state Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was required to submit a Clean
Energy Plan to the Governor by October 1, 2019. Considering that the Plan is the product of an
executive order instead of a piece of legislation, the DEQ committed to be open and inclusive in
the process of developing the Plan by involving stakeholder input and creating a living document
that could evolve. Because investor-owned utilities are the primary producers and distributors of
energy in the state, they will play a vital role in attempts to meet the goals of the Clean Energy
Plan. Two of the state’s primary utilities, Duke Energy and Dominion Energy, have recently
committed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 (Dominion Energy 2020, Duke Energy 2019).
This will go a long way in ensuring that all parties involved are on the same page in meeting the
goals of the plan. However, both utilities both appear committed to expanding electricity
generation via natural gas as well. While the fuel contains less harmful pollutants than coal, it
has been viewed as a bridge fuel – not an end-goal climate solution (Nunez 2014). In addition,
the companies’ plans may change over the next few decades with economic trends as well as
executive and stakeholder goals.
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Among other goals, the Clean Energy Plan aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
70% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to attain carbon neutrality by 2050 (“North Carolina Clean
Energy Plan” 2019). While the state already is a national leader in solar energy, the solar
industry will undoubtedly continue to be important in building up greater renewable resources
and working with utilities to modernize and decarbonize the electricity grid.
While the Plan is undoubtedly a step in the right direction for North Carolina’s climate
change policies, it is important to note that the Plan is just that: a plan. Although its creation was
mandated by Governor Cooper, it was created to provide recommendations and a roadmap to
achieve its stated goals. It does not actually contain regulations or official state policy; rather, it
describes how different bodies – like the still-Republican General Assembly, the NCUC, or
public utilities – can help put the plan into action. The Plan is also in its very early stages, since it
was submitted to Governor Cooper in October of 2019. With Governor Cooper up for reelection
in the fall of 2020 and a Plan that looks three decades ahead, it is unclear whether future
governors and General Assemblies will fully commit to achieving the Plan’s ambitious goals.
External Factors
Policies that have helped to shape North Carolina’s solar industry have largely come
from state government, but outside events and influences have shaped the way that North
Carolinians view solar energy as well as energy in general. Utilities play a major role in the
state’s politics, but they have also been affected by outside events.
Climate Change
The first major warnings of the dangers of carbon emissions and anthropogenic climate
change came with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Although the United States never ratified the
international treaty, the topic of climate change entered the national radar as a potential issue.

42
Since then, projections of the impacts of climate change have grown more dire as the topic has
become more polarizing in American politics (“UN Climate Change Annual Report 2018”
2018). President Obama’s signing of the Paris Agreement and subsequent issuance of the Clean
Power Plan appeared to place the federal government in a leadership position of climate change
mitigation, but President Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris treaty and rollback of
the Clean Power Plan has placed the onus of climate policy on individual states that are willing
to act. Many states and municipalities have pledged to honor the Paris Agreement, including
North Carolina. With a Democratic governor at the helm and a growing population concerned
about climate change, it was likely that climate policy would factor into future energy policy
(Marlon et al 2019).
The Coal Ash Problem
Over the past decade, North Carolinians have increasingly held utilities responsible for
issues surrounding coal ash, which is a major byproduct of coal combustion that can contain
heavy metals dangerous to human health (Ruhl et al 2009). In 2014, Duke Energy and its coal
plants came to the forefront of energy news when a pipe under one of its coal ash retention ponds
burst, releasing about 39,000 tons of coal ash into the Dan River in the northern portion of the
state. Following the spill, politicians and citizens alike called for Duke Energy to be held
responsible and clean up the spill, as well as to remove its coal ash located elsewhere in the state.
Finally, in January of 2020, Duke Energy and DEQ announced that the utility would be cleaning
up six coal ash storage ponds and replacing them with lined storage pits, making it the largest
coal ash cleanup in the American history (Martin 2020).
While the coal ash issue in North Carolina is not explicitly linked to solar energy and the
solar industry, it may have led to greater recognition of the costs of fossil fuels and therefore
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greater demand for alternative sources of energy. Following the spill, a poll conducted for the
Sierra Club found that a majority of North Carolinians – across the political spectrum –
supported greater regulation and restrictions of hazardous fossil fuel waste (Pollard 2014). When
the human health threats of coal ash are combined with the threat of climate change and
decreasing costs of renewable energy, North Carolinian support for shutting down coal plants
and promoting renewable energy is high. Interestingly, polling records over the last five years
suggest that statewide support for renewable energy was at its peak in 2015, just one year after
the Dan River spill (“Emerging Energy Issues and North Carolina Trends.” 2019).
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Solar Energy in South Carolina
Background
State Politics
Compared to its sister state of North Carolina, politics in South Carolina are almost
simple. The state itself is much more rural than North Carolina, which leads to a consistent
Republican majority (Figure 11). Because of its clear conservative leanings, energy decisions for
the state have largely been decisions about cost and saving taxpayer money with energy bills that
were formerly some of the lowest in the country. As the state has slowly grown in population,
especially in the regions around urban Greenville, Columbia, and Charleston, it has become less
Republican leaning. With the business-friendly approach that accompanies a Republican

Figure 11: County Voting Records in the 2016 Presidential Election (“2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Results by State and
County.” n.d.).
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majority, utilities in the state have historically enjoyed favorable regulation by the Public Service
Commission (PSC) that generally promulgates rules by the letter of the law and no more.
Energy Statistics
South Carolina has an interesting history when it comes to utilities. The state’s territory is
largely split into a few distinct regions where investor-owned utilities had monopolies with the
exception of small municipal utilities and electric cooperatives. The major utility players in the
state are South Carolina Electric and Gas (SCE&G) and Duke Energy Corporation, which is split
into two separate territories of Duke Energy Progress (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC)
(Figures 12 and 13). The third major utility in the state, Santee Cooper, is owned by the state.
Because of that, it has little direct power in state politics. As discussed in a subsequent section,
SCE&G was sold in 2019 to Dominion Energy after abandoning the construction of two new

Figure 12: Dominion Energy Coverage Area in South Carolina (“Electric Utility Service Areas” n.d.).
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Figure 13: Duke Energy Coverage Area in South Carolina (“Electric Utility Service Areas” n.d.).

nuclear reactors in the state– a project that Santee Cooper was also involved in. Although Duke
Energy is certainly powerful politically within the state, SCE&G’s (and now Dominion
Energy’s) larger service area has led to its dominance as the most politically powerful utility in
the state. While Santee Cooper is still owned by the state, its future after the nuclear plant failure
is still up in the air.
Due to decision-making within the state government that historically has focused on cost,
South Carolina’s energy portfolio is heavy on fossil fuels and nuclear power. In fact, nuclear
power provides over half of the state’s electricity, and large portions of electricity are still
produced by natural gas and coal (“South Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019). Like North
Carolina, the state has one of the higher demands of energy in the United States due to its high
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Figure 14: Annual Solar Installations in South Carolina (“South Carolina Solar” n.d.).

summer temperatures. Unlike its neighbor, however, it has milder winters that allow a lesser
demand during the winter.
Due to a number of factors discussed later in this essay, South Carolina has experienced a
sudden and rapid growth in its solar industry over the past few years (Figure 14). While it has a
lot of work to do before it catches North Carolina, the state is quickly turning into a viable solar
energy market. Nationally, South Carolina ranks 16th in installed solar capacity and placed in the
top 10 in installed capacity added in 2019 (“South Carolina Solar” n.d.). Because of the factors
listed below, support for clean energy in South Carolina is high. Polling has shown that a strong
majority of voters in South Carolina support the development of renewable energy within the
state, and a majority would support a political candidate that supports encouraging development
of renewable energy sources through economic incentives (“South Carolina Clean Energy
Survey” 2019). In South Carolina’s political sphere, where cost and payback of investments are
vital, the latter majority indicates a shift in thinking and a belief across the ideological spectrum
that renewable energy can work for South Carolinians.

48
Government Action
PURPA Regulations
As previously mentioned, with the passage of PURPA in 1978 states were required to
determine the size of QFs, calculate avoided cost rates, and determine standard contract terms. In
1981, under the terms of PURPA, South Carolina’s PSC began the process of implementing
PURPA within the state. However, the PSC established very little. They decided not to set a
minimum contract length at the time because of differing concerns between utilities. They
decided to “[encourage] each affected electrical utility to offer contracts of five year duration”
but avoided setting a minimum contract length (Public Service Commission of South Carolina
1981).
Because avoided cost was a new concept at the time, the PSC declared in 1982 that it
would be “in the public interest” to set a standard avoided cost methodology for a few years until
the relevant utilities had more experience with its complexities (Public Service Commission of
South Carolina 1982). In 1985, they finally decided to determine a standard methodology for
each utility (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1985). Instead of setting a standard
methodology across utilities regardless of circumstance, they instead approved separate
methodologies for each one. Once again, during this decision, the PSC made the choice not to set
contract lengths for power purchase agreements and instead urged “voluntary negotiations of
long-term contracts” (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1985).
In 1989, the PSC held additional hearings regarding PURPA implementation. By that
time, both the PSC and the utilities had begun to more fully understand avoided costs and power
purchase agreements. In an order stemming from these hearings, the PSC once again decided that
long term contracts “should not be mandated”, despite SCE&G and Duke Energy both offering
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certain contracts in 10- and 15-year terms (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1989).
During these hearings, Duke Energy also submitted a standard contract form for PSC approval.
Not only did the PSC approve, but they also ordered SCE&G and Carolina Power and Light –
another utility that would eventually merge with Progress Energy and then Duke Energy – to
submit their own standard contract forms.
Although there is a large gap in PSC dockets archived on the Commission’s website from
1989 to 2003, it appears that minimum contract lengths were not set for utilities until the passage
of Act 62 in 2019.
Tax Credits
In 2006, almost three decades after North Carolina passed the Energy Conservation Act
that laid the groundwork in the state for a renewable energy tax credit, South Carolina passed
Act 386: a wide-reaching tax reform that included a 25% tax credit for “the installation of a solar
energy heating or cooling system, or both, in a building owned by the taxpayer” (S.C. S. 1245).
The tax credit cannot exceed $3,500 or half of the taxpayer’s tax liability for that year, whichever
is less. Similar to the tax credit given in North Carolina’s Energy Conservation Act, this credit
included only provisions for solar heating and cooling but not solar photovoltaics. Just two years
later, however, Act 354 in 2007 included solar energy systems for the purpose of generating
electricity as a kind of system eligible for the tax credit, and subsequent amendments in the years
since have added other forms of renewable energy (S.C. S. 243). Currently, the tax credit does
not have a set expiration date.
VC Summer and the Nuclear Fiasco
Following the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005, which included billions of dollars in
subsidies for the nuclear power industry, legislators in the state of South Carolina, acting in
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concert with the major utilities in the state, sought to make the construction of large base-load
power plants easier for utilities (H.R. 6). This came in the form of Act 16 in 2007, also known as
the Base Load Review Act, that demonstrates the political power that utilities have had in
shaping South Carolina politics. The main purpose of this legislation was to “provide for the
recovery of the prudently incurred costs associated with new base load plants […] when
constructed by investor owned electrical utilities, while at the same time protecting customers of
investor owned electrical utilities from responsibility for imprudent financial obligations or
costs” (S.C. S. 431). Ironically, the latter part of its purpose proved ineffective in the years
following the bill’s passing.
The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station, located about thirty miles northwest
of the capital city of Columbia, is jointly owned by SCE&G and the state-owned utility Santee
Cooper (Walton 2017). Similar to most of the other nuclear stations throughout the United
States, VC Summer first began producing power in the 1980s. In February of 2009, following
years without new construction of nuclear power plants in the country, the PSC approved a
project request by the two utilities to build two additional nuclear reactors at the nuclear plant –
despite opposition from the start about the plant’s cost (Brown 2018, Crumbo 2009). After
reaching a contract with Westinghouse Electric Company to help build the new reactors, SCE&G
and Santee Cooper announced that the anticipated budget of construction would be
approximately $9.8 billion. Through the Base Load Review Act, the utilities began to recoup
$1.229 billion of that cost by increasing customer electricity bills prior to completion of the
project. However, once construction of the reactors began in 2013, costs quickly rose to reach
over $25 billion. In 2017, Westinghouse Electric Company declared bankruptcy in part due to
cost overruns at VC Summer and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant –another nuclear generating
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plant under construction in Georgia. Just months later, both Santee Cooper and SCE&G
abandoned the project – which was now billions of dollars over budget. Over the course of the
project, SCE&G increased the electricity bills of its statewide customers a total of nine times for
two nuclear reactors that will never be completed. At one point, “about one-fifth of SCE&G
customers’ power bills were paying for the project”, in total accounting for around $2 billion of
wasted money (Bland and Wilks 2018).
The backlash following the utilities’ abandonment of the project was immediate. Several
lawsuits followed against the utilities and were settled. Especially damning was the Bechtel
Report, an outside study – conducted over a year before the project’s abandonment – that
detailed critical problems with the reactors’ construction (Final Bechtel Report 2017). At the
time, the report was hidden from regulators by SCE&G. In dire financial straits because of the
overruns, lawsuits, and plummeting stock prices, SCE&G and its parent corporation SCANA
Corp. were forced to be sold. Dominion Energy, their new owner, then refunded its new
customers over $2 billion in the form of rate reductions and refunds (Wilks 2018). Dominion
also took on billions of dollars of debt left over from the abandoned project. Santee Cooper, the
state-run utility, could also be sold in the near future, although its future is unknown at the time
of writing.
There were also non-financial repercussions. The state’s Office of Regulatory Staff –
which at the time had a conflicting mission of protecting both customers and utilities – and the
PSC drew heavy fire from lawmakers and citizens (Wilks 2018). Because SCE&G was a major
utility in the state, pressure also fell on state senators and representatives to ensure that the same
mistakes were not repeated. In 2018, following months of debate and a veto by Governor Henry
McMaster, House Bill 4375 was enacted, which effectively repealed the Base Load Review Act
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(S.C. H. 4375). The general public and politicians still weren’t done, though. Ultimately, the VC
Summer fiasco led to greater consumer demands for renewable energy and greater consumer
choice, with some calling for a move away from the absolute monopoly of utilities in regional
electricity markets. The culmination of this was the Energy Freedom Act of 2019.
Act 236
Before the VC Summer debacle came to a head, some progress was being made on solar
energy in South Carolina. However, for people looking to install solar prior to 2014, there were
huge regulatory obstacles to overcome. While there was no explicit ban on solar leasing, laws
establishing utility monopoly in a region meant that leasing solar panels from a third party was
considered to be illegally purchasing power from another provider. Another barrier to
installation, however, was simply bureaucracy. Prior to 2014, South Carolina was notorious for
making it difficult for people to install solar panels. In fact, one national report ranked South
Carolina dead last in ease of installation (Wiedman et al. 2012). A third factor critical to the solar
inaction was the lack of a renewable energy standard, such as what one might see in a state with
a renewable portfolio standard. Finally, in South Carolina, nuclear power was (and still is) king.
Over half of electricity in the state is produced by nuclear power generation facilities. In addition
to the ultimately doomed construction of VC Summers reactors as well as other nuclear reactors
around the state, South Carolina houses the Savannah River Site nuclear weapons complex and
supports nuclear waste disposal industries.
In 2014, lawmakers passed Act 236, which marked the first substantial renewable energy
legislation within the state and addressed many of the issues facing the solar industry prior to its
passage (S.C. S. 1189). It was the result of extensive lobbying and input from the solar industry,
a coalition of environmentalist groups, utilities, policy-makers, and other interested parties (“Act
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236 Progression” n.d.). According to the South Carolina Energy Office, the Act would “create
jobs, lessen South Carolina’s dependence on fossil fuel imports, expand customer choice, further
diversify utility generation mixes, and reduce pollution in the Palmetto State” (“Act 236
Summary” 2016). Because of South Carolina’s conservative leanings, climate change was rarely
mentioned as a motivation for adding solar energy; instead, it was largely framed by its
proponents as an economic issue. North Carolina’s solar industry had begun to boom, so
advocates of solar energy tried to frame it as an issue of rivalry for jobs and saving South
Carolinians money. On the other side, utilities like SCE&G and Duke Energy were largely
opposed to the idea of solar energy on the basis that it would hurt their bottom lines. Despite the
utility power in the state legislature, enough momentum built to bring about a compromise
between solar energy’s opponents and proponents – a compromise that passed unanimously
through the State House.
Section 2 of Act 236, also known as the Distributed Energy Resources Program, allowed
utilities to voluntarily submit renewable energy programs to the Commission for approval. If
approved, the utilities would be required to develop a set capacity of renewable energy facilities
within the state of South Carolina. This set number would be determined by “an aggregated
amount of installed nameplate generation capacity equal to at least two percent of the previous
five-year average of the electrical utility's South Carolina retail peak demand” (S.C. S. 1189). By
creating this section of Act 236, legislators ensured that participating utilities would commit to a
modest renewable portfolio standard of two percent. Despite the voluntary nature of this
standard, Duke Energy’s subsidiaries and SCE&G – the largest utilities in the state – submitted
Distributed Energy Resources Programs for Commission approval. Although solar energy was
listed as only one of a number of “distributed energy sources” in the legislation, the years since
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its passage have shown that the vast majority of added capacity has come in the form of solar
power.
In addition to the voluntary renewable portfolio standard under the Distributed Energy
Resources Program, the utilities would be able to recover their avoided costs by incremental
increases on customer electricity bills. In the name of consumer protection, however, annual rate
increases were capped at $12 for residential customers, $120 for commercial customers, and
$1200 for industrial customers. While the full issues about VC Summer had not come out yet at
the time of Act 236’s passage, rate increases due to construction were still being felt at the time.
Act 236 sought to prevent similar cost overruns for renewable energy from hurting customers.
Another part of Act 236, under Section 3, ensured the short-term growth of net metering
within the state. Prior to this, net metering programs in South Carolina were minimal and
voluntary for utilities. Under this provision, utilities would be required to make net metering
programs available to customer-generators on a first-come, first-serve basis until “the total
nameplate generating capacity of net energy metering systems equals two percent of the previous
five-year average of the electrical utility's South Carolina retail peak demand” (S.C. S. 1189).
Unlike the Distributed Energy Resource Program, this part of Act 236 was mandatory for all
utilities. However, a theoretical cap was placed on net metering in the state. As such, utilities
were not required to approve net metering applications after that two percent number was
reached, which all but ensured that the utilities would not go over the cap. At the time of Act
236’s passing, there was no clear consensus on just how impactful the legislation would be.
Some people, especially solar energy’s proponents, were optimistic that a “solar boom” was
coming for the state, while others were still unconvinced (Trabish 2018). Ultimately, net
metering exploded in the state with widespread popularity, especially for SCE&G/Dominion
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Energy (Figure 15). Because of the rapid solar boom, utilities reached the two-percent cap more
quickly than anticipated. This resulted in a reduced growth of net-metering customers in 2019, as
well as a smaller number of solar installations in that year (see Figure 14).
While but a small part of the overall Act, one part of the net metering section detailed
how the Commission “shall initiate a generic proceeding for purposes of implementing the
requirements of this chapter with respect to the net energy metering rates, tariffs, charges, and
credits of electrical utilities, specifically to establish the methodology to set necessary charges
and credits” (S.C. S. 1189). Because utilities are required under net metering laws to pay
customer-generators for the electricity they produce, the valuation of distributed energy
resources – and solar energy in particular – has been a contentious issue across the United States.
Utility customer-generators would prefer to be paid the full retail rate for the energy they

Figure 15: Growth of Net Energy Metering (NEM) in the State of South Carolina by Investor-Owned Utility. Data Courtesy of
Utility Filings to PSC, Docket 2005-385-E.
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produce (also known as a 1:1 rate), while utilities would prefer to pay as little as possible for that
energy. In the months following the passage of Act 236, this debate was a battleground between
interested parties.
Finally, a major component of Act 236 was its explicit legalization of renewable energy
leasing. For individuals looking to install solar panels at their home or property, this provision
helped to overcome a major obstacle of cost. Section 4 of Act 236 explicitly stated that:
“An entity owning renewable electric generation facilities in compliance with the terms
of this article shall not be considered an 'electrical utility' […] if the renewable electric
generation facilities are only made available to a customer-generator lessee for the
customer-generator lessee's use on the customer-generator lessee's premises or the
residence where the renewable electric generation facilities are located, or for the sale of
energy to that customer-generator lessee's retail electric provider or its designee, and
pursuant to a lease”.
While solar lessors were required to obtain certification from the state’s Office of Regulatory
staff, this article of Act 236 opened the door for even greater affordability of residential solar
energy. This clause ensured that third-party leasing of solar panels would not violate or serve as
competition to each utility’s regional monopoly. Additionally, the article allowed utilities to
introduce their own leasing programs (without recovering costs from other customers) so as not
to be completely left out of the market. In doing this, legislators promoted full competition
between solar panel providers, which was seen as a good thing. The Act did exclude the
possibility for multiple customers to participate in the leasing of solar panels, such as those
customers that are renters or those that live in multi-family homes, an issue that would ultimately
be addressed by the Energy Freedom Act and its encouragement of community solar.
Post-Act 236
Following the signing of Act 236 into law, one of the major questions remaining was one
of net metering: how should utilities reimburse customer-generators for the energy that they
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produce? Because of Act 236’s requirements, utilities were faced with a question of how
distributed energy resources (and solar power in particular) should be valued. Following a
lengthy discussion between stakeholders, the PSC approved a settlement agreement in 2015 that
established, in part, that 1:1 (full) net metering rates would be given to customer-generators
through January 1, 2021 (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2015). Following this
agreement, utilities were required to file new applications to the PSC for the approval of their net
metering programs.
In the spring of 2018, faced with the issues presented by VC Summer as well as the rapid
growth of solar and the rapidly approaching 2% cap (Figure 16), legislators attempted to
establish a new energy bill: House Bill 4421. While House Bill 4421 was an all-encompassing
bill that sought to address many of the state’s energy issues at the time, a primary provision of it
was the removal of the 2% cap on renewable energy capacity (S.C. H. 4421). Furthermore, it
introduced new net metering regulations that would have simplified rate structures.

Figure 16: Progress Under Act 236 Toward Distributed Energy Resource Program Goals as of December 2018 (“Discussion of
South Carolina Act 236: Version 2.0” 2018).
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Because of the energy policy discussions occurring at the time in the state, House Bill
4421 enjoyed wide support from both lawmakers and the general public – but not from utilities,
who complained that installing solar on the grid cost them money. It passed the House with an
easy majority and appeared to soon be bound for the Senate; however, everything changed the
following week. At the last minute, just before a routine final approval, utility allies in the House
raised concerns about a small portion of the bill that would exempt residential solar arrays from
taxation (Fretwell 2018). Because the bill included a tax exemption, they argued successfully
that the bill technically required a two-thirds majority to pass the House. With a 61-44 vote, the
House failed to pass the bill. The effects of this were seen immediately with widespread criticism
from legislators on both sides of the aisle. While the technicality could have been addressed
earlier in the process by a committee, the utilities waited until the eleventh hour and showed their
political power once again to kill a bill they opposed. With the bill dead, no further energy
legislation was passed during that year.
As part of Act 236 and just a few months after House Bill 4421 was killed, the South
Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS) and the ORS Energy Office held a series of
stakeholder meetings in the second half of 2018 to discuss the legislation, its ensuing regulations,
and the future of energy in South Carolina. These stakeholders included “representatives from
private and public electric utilities and cooperatives, renewable energy developers and solar
industry groups, environmental and environmental justice organizations, consumer advocates,
large energy users, and researchers from the Savannah River National Laboratory” (“Discussion
of South Carolina Act 236: Version 2.0” 2018). In addition, ORS retained a third-party
consultant in Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc. (E3) to produce a report on how future
energy legislation (described as “Act 236 2.0”) might look.

59
Rather than prescribing specific policy solutions as a third party, E3 described the most
contentious issues and laid out each side’s positions. These key issues included rate design, the
“value of solar”, commercial and industrial renewable energy programs, and utility scale/PURPA
installations. While these issues were not addressed by an “Act 236 2.0”, they preceded the talks
that would result in Act 62.
Act 62 and Energy Freedom
For lawmakers, there were several new issues to address in 2019. The first was to ensure
that VC Summer or anything like it would not happen again. Second, lawmakers on both sides of
the aisle wanted to ensure a continued growth of the solar industry. A key concept emphasized
was the idea of “energy freedom”, which would help give South Carolinians greater energy
choices. Because utility customers under SCE&G had no choice in the increased rates given by
the utility during VC Summer’s construction, lawmakers placed an emphasis on the idea that
customers could choose programs – such as solar energy programs – and rates that fit their needs
or values. Third, as projections on climate change grew increasingly grim, some lobbyists and
lawmakers began to feel more comfortable bringing it up as a problem area – especially in
coastal areas like Charleston that are particularly vulnerable to climate change (“Greenhouse Gas
Emissions” n.d.). Finally, as battery costs continue to fall, the legislature needed to consider the
implications of battery storage on renewable energy – and solar in particular – within the state.
Following the death of House Bill 4421 at the hands of utilities in 2018, most lawmakers
started the next legislative session with a renewed determination to pass a comprehensive energy
bill, especially due to solar lobbyists emphasizing that need and beginning pre-session
discussions. The utilities, perhaps recognizing the writing on the walls, switched focus from full
opposition of solar towards working to make new legislation work best for them. As a result,
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House Bill 3659 was signed into law by Governor Henry McMaster in May 2019 as Act 62, also
known as the Energy Freedom Act (S.C. H. 3659). Interestingly, the legislation describes “the
state's policy of encouraging renewable energy” and lists the intent to build upon Act 236’s
successes while preventing a “disruption to the growing market” of renewable energy (S.C. H.
3659). While it left many decisions up to the PSC, the Act implied a clear direction for the PSC
to work toward.
As with Act 236, this new legislation contains a multitude of different provisions. Section
1 would potentially benefit utility-scale solar, as it requires for the PSC to open a docket to
determine each utility’s standard offer and avoided cost methodologies as required by PURPA.
This process will be repeated every two years to keep the terms updated. In addition, it sets
standard offer contracts to a minimum length of 10 years and a “commercially reasonable terms”
for small power producers. For contracts longer than 10 years, however, additional terms and
conditions would need to be included in the agreement.
Another part of Section 1 contains details for voluntary renewable energy programs for
commercial and industrial customers. Under this section, the legislation mandates that utilities
file a voluntary renewable energy program to the PSC for customers with a demand greater than
one megawatt in a single location. It also gives the customers the right to directly negotiate with
an energy supplier on price and terms of the renewable energy. Many of South Carolina’s large
manufacturers, such as Boeing, had expressed prior interest in using renewable energy in at least
part of their operations, and this helped to address those desires while also signaling to out-ofstate companies that the state would be supportive of their energy goals. Finally, this section of
the Act mandated that participating customers would bear the costs associated with their
renewable program, which helped to ensure that costs would not be passed onto nonparticipating
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customers.
In addition, Section 1 specifically signals that the state would like “to expand the
opportunity to support solar energy and support access to solar energy options for all South
Carolinians”. While the direct reference to the expansion of solar energy was surprising given
the lack of specific energy sources mentioned in prior energy policies, this section sought to
build upon the rapidly growing solar industry within the state. To ensure that all South
Carolinians would have access to solar energy regardless of income level or property viability,
the legislation encouraged each utility in the state to develop community solar programs. Once
again, the section also included a customer-protection clause that ensured that nonparticipating
customers would not bear the costs of community solar programs. Although this section only
encouraged utilities to create such programs (instead of a mandate), it communicated a clear
intent from the General Assembly to promote solar energy availability for all citizens within the
state.
Perhaps the most important portion of the legislation is not explicitly mentioned in its
wording. Because utilities had approached or reached the two percent caps on net metering and
renewable energy facilities so quickly, there was a clear need to adjust or remove the cap. Act 62
amended the 1976 Code by removing the two percent clauses altogether, thus removing further
regulatory barriers to the expansion of renewable energy and the solar industry within the state.
Beyond the removal of the caps, Act 62 further benefitted customer-generators in several
ways. The first way, located in Section 3, was through a new definition of the term “customergenerator” that now includes “an energy storage device configured to receive electrical charge
solely from an onsite renewable energy resource” (S.C. H. 3659). Because of the growing
popularity of solar panel/battery packages offered to homeowners, such language was necessary
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to put a number on and benefit the residential customers that were investing in battery
technology. In addition, the inclusion of battery storage helps to both make solar energy more
reliable and affordable for many homeowners.
Act 62 also adjusted net metering regulations within the state by building upon the
settlement agreement from 2015 (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2015). The first
step, written in Section 5, was a provision that granted full 1:1 net metering until 2029 for all
customers that applied to a utility by June 1, 2021. After that date, customers that applied would
receive rates determined by the PSC using a “solar choice metering tariff” instead of a net
metering tariff. This solar choice metering tariff, while intentionally vague in the legislation,
would assess the value provided by the customer solar generation to the grid. In addition, utilities
could continue to recover distributed energy resource program costs from customer-generators
applying before the June 1, 2021 deadline.
In November of 2019, just a few months after Act 62 was enacted with the full intent to
promote the state’s solar energy industry, the PSC issued two landmark rulings regarding utility
standard offers and avoided cost methodologies. Instead of establishing standard offers that
would be considered fair by both solar proponents and by utilities, the PSC established standard
offers with the lowest rates in the country – effectively crippling a major portion of the solar
industry and creating a “solar doomsday” (Fretwell 2019a, Public Service Commission of South
Carolina 2019a, Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2019b). In addition, the PSC
ruled that contract lengths longer than ten years were unnecessary. By ruling as they did, the PSC
all but shut down the industry for utility-scale solar farms – despite a clear intent by the
legislature to expand opportunities for growth within the solar industry. According to the South
Carolina Solar Business Alliance, the PSC “made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
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new solar projects to be financed and built” (Fretwell 2019a). Just a few months later, in January
2020, the PSC partially reversed course and issued a new ruling for Dominion Energy following
public outcry from lawmakers, citizens, environmental groups, and the solar industry (Brown
2020, Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2020). While the new avoided cost values
are still not high, they are certainly more favorable to the solar industry than the previous ones.
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Discussion
Where the States Stand Now
As of now, North Carolina is far ahead of South Carolina in solar capacity and
installations. This is partially due to North Carolina’s longer timeline of policies (Figure 17),
which has allowed it greater expansion of the solar industry and attempts to make solar energy
work best for all involved. Its REPS, in particular, has helped to ensure growth of solar and other
renewables in the state. While some of its laws, such as the tax credits that were implemented
decades ago, may have helped spur early development of solar, the REPS in 2007 and favorable
conditions to PURPA QFs were what really began to drive North Carolina’s solar development
before South Carolina could start. Over the past decade, and especially since South Carolina’s
Act 236, the two states have grappled largely with the same issues of solar leasing, standard
offers for utility-scale solar, net metering, and the value of solar.
In addition to getting a head start, North Carolina’s policies have been for the most part
more progressive than those in South Carolina. One reason for this has been differing
demographics: North Carolina’s more urban, more progressive population and government was
quicker to support renewable energy and recognize the threats of climate change. Through these
more liberal perspectives, policies emerged that helped North Carolina become a national leader

Figure 17: Timeline of Major Solar Legislation in North and South Carolina.
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Policy
PURPA Qualifying
Facilities
PURPA contract lengths
Community Solar
Renewable Portfolio
Standard
Net Metering

State Tax Credit
Climate Goals

North Carolina
Smaller than 1 MW; formerly
smaller than 5 MW
10 years; formerly 15 years
Mandated utility programs
12.5% target by 2021
Rates depending on customer
choice (Time-of-use or
standard);
Limited to 1 MW in size.
None; formerly 35%
Carbon-neutral by 2050

South Carolina
Smaller than 2 MW
10 years
Encouraged for utilities
None; formerly a voluntary
renewable energy goal
1:1 until 2029 for customers
applying before 6/1/2021;
Shifting to solar choice
metering tariff after that date.
25%
None

Table 1: Summary of Major Renewable Energy Policies in North and South Carolina.

in solar energy while South Carolina was left to catch up (Table 1). First, its tax credits (35%)
were higher than South Carolina’s (25%). Although the sunset expiration of North Carolina’s tax
credits has helped to put the two states on a more level playing field, a large portion of North
Carolina’s development came prior to that expiration. Another major factor is the renewable
portfolio standard in North Carolina. Although fairly modest from today’s perspective, a
legislative mandate of 12.5% renewable energy capacity on the grid stood out from any policies
in any other southeastern state. While South Carolina did introduce a pseudo-renewable portfolio
standard with Act 236, it was both voluntary and filled only two percent of the state’s capacity.
North Carolina’s mandates, combined with its generous contract terms under PURPA at the time,
were major factors in its solar boom.
Looking Ahead: What’s Next?
Even though both states took drastically different paths to build the solar industries they
have today, they each have significant progress still to be made. In order to meet North
Carolina’s climate goals, renewable energy will need to be expanded several times greater than
its current levels. Although renewable energy on a large scale has largely consisted of solar
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energy in the state, expansion of the offshore wind industry – a possible competitor for utility
projects – is likely to commence in the next few years. It helps North Carolina that Dominion
and Duke Energy have pledged to be carbon-neutral by 2050 as well (Dominion Energy 2020,
Duke Energy 2019). By viewing the utilities as partners and stakeholders instead of opponents
and obstacles, the state will achieve a cleaner transition. When considering that Dominion and
Duke are also the major utilities in the state of South Carolina, the same decarbonization goals
will hopefully drive renewable energy development within that state as well – even without
specific state-mandated climate goals.
To achieve these goals will require large-scale adjustments to the energy grid overall.
Even though increased battery storage will help to reduce some of the variability in solar energy
supply, some restructuring still needs to be done in order for renewables to completely take over
from fossil fuel combustion plants. State governments and utilities will need to determine the
best ways to reconfigure the electrical grid to accommodate distributed energy production over
centralized power plants. In addition, they will need to determine how best to compensate
customer-generators for the power they produce at home and contribute to the overall grid. Such
a transition could lead to the creation of jobs in one field but the removal of jobs in another. For
example, Santee Cooper, South Carolina’s state-owned utility, has announced plans to close one
of its two remaining coal plants beginning in 2023 (Fretwell 2019b). Although they hope to
move their employees to other positions within the company, some jobs will be lost as people
decide to retire or work elsewhere. At the same time, the solar industry employs more people
nationally than coal, oil, and gas combined (McCarthy 2017).
Politically, both states – but South Carolina especially – could see a shift in the balance
of power in and around the state legislatures. Prior to the fallback from VC Summer, SCE&G
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was seen as a major political force in state politics; however, their power has since been reduced.
According to Sammy Fretwell, a reporter for The State newspaper, there is a sense that
legislators in South Carolina feel emboldened to speak out more against utilities, especially the
major ones. It is too soon to determine if Dominion Energy will regain some or all of SCE&G’s
lost influence, but they certainly keep the appearance of trying to right past wrongs by paying
back SCE&G’s former customers. In North Carolina, Duke Energy has faced scathing criticism
from environmental groups, some lawmakers, and the general public regarding their handling
and disposal of coal ash, but it is uncertain if their political sway has diminished in any way
since Governor Cooper’s election as governor. In March of 2020, an article described some of
the “rewards” that Duke Energy has provided over the past several years to lawmakers voting in
its interests (Ouzts 2020). The utility has been active in providing donations from political action
committees, advertising, flyers, and campaign contributions to candidates and members of the
state legislature – even those who were not up for re-election. Duke Energy and Dominion
Energy rank among the largest utilities in the country, so a large shift in political power is
unlikely due to their resources alone – not to mention that Duke Energy is headquartered in
Charlotte, North Carolina.
Finally, the states could see some changes in laws at the federal level. Although North
Carolina has begun to move away from the advantageous requirements of PURPA through
competitive procurement utility programs, South Carolina still will rely on its PURPA
requirements for the near future to further build its renewable energy industries. However, talks
have come up recently around Washington, DC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
around the terms of PURPA. While the law has been changed a number of times since its
passage, mostly recently with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the main goal is still the same: to
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promote the development of small, independent renewable energy facilities. PURPA’s opponents
today argue that its purpose is no longer necessary, since solar photovoltaics are now mostly
competitive with conventional forms of energy production – for now (Inskeep 2018). That could
change as the tax credit slowly expires over the course of 2019, 2020, and 2021. While the entire
legislation is unlikely to be repealed, key provisions of the law could be amended in the near
future. In addition to potential changes in PURPA, the federal investment tax credit is set to
expire in 2022. Depending on the outcomes of the 2020 elections and the perceived need (by
some) for comprehensive federal climate legislation, however, the tax credit could be extended
further.
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Conclusion
Despite vastly different paths and motivations, North and South Carolina are both well on
their way to having solar energy make up a significant portion of their energy portfolios. North
Carolina is ranked second in the country in installed solar capacity, mainly due to the generous
contracts handed out to PURPA-qualifying facilities and renewable portfolio standard. While
both policies have been replaced or made obsolete by newer policies – reduced PURPAmandated contracts, competitive procurement programs, and a carbon-neutral goal by 2050 – the
future for solar energy in North Carolina has plenty of room for expansion. Further help will
hopefully come from major utilities Duke Energy and Dominion Energy, which have both
adopted climate goals that align with that of North Carolina. With solar panels that are costcompetitive, favorable policies to growth, and utilities that share a common goal with the state,
the future is bright in the state.
In South Carolina, the solar industry is just beginning to grow. Freed from the twopercent caps on net metering and overall renewable energy capacity, the solar industry is starting
to take advantage of the state tax credit still in place and a high demand for alternative energy
sources. Due to the fallout of the VC Summer fiasco, lawmakers may be willing to meet that
demand by further promoting the solar industry and removing legislative and regulatory barriers
to implementation. In future years or even decades, South Carolina could also adopt climate
goals or a renewable portfolio standard. Despite the climate goals of Duke Energy and Dominion
Energy, the two utilities still seem to be opposed to the unrestricted growth of solar in the state.
Due to their power within the legislature, the utilities will likely have a heavy hand in shaping
South Carolinian (and North Carolinian) energy policy for years to come.

70
References
Act 16, S. 431, 117th Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2007).
Act 62, H. 3659, 123rd Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2019).
Act 83, S. 243, 117th Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2007).
Act 236, S. 1189, 120th Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2014)
“Act 236 Progression.” n.d. S.C. Energy Office. Accessed May 3, 2020.
http://energy.sc.gov/energyplan/act236.
“Act 236 Summary.” 2016. S.C. Energy Office.
http://www.energy.sc.gov/files/view/Act%20236_Final_4-5-16.pdf.
Act 258, H. 4375, 122nd Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2018)
Act 386, S. 1245, 116th Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2006).
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009).
Barbose, Galen, Naim Darghouth, Salma Elmallah, Sydney Forrester, Kristina S. H., Kristina,
Dev Millstein, Joseph Rand, Will Cotton, Stacy Sherwood, and Eric O’Shaughnessy.
2019. “Tracking the Sun: Pricing and Design Trends for Distributed Photovoltaic
Systems in the United States - 2019 Edition.” 1574343. https://doi.org/10.2172/1574343.
Bland, David T., and Avery G. Wilks. “SCANA settles $2 billion lawsuit over VC Summer
project’s failure”. The State (Columbia, SC), November 24, 2018.
https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article222135440.html.
Brown, Andrew. “SC utility regulators reverse course in case between Dominion and solar
developers.” Post and Courier. January 3, 2020.
https://www.postandcourier.com/business/sc-utility-regulators-reverse-course-in-casebetween-dominion-and-solar-developers/article_64a1f44a-2e55-11ea-a6485701b68a5f53.html.
Brown, Andrew. “Was the 2007 Law That Jumpstarted S.C. Nuclear Project Unconstitutional?
Attorneys Ask Circuit Judge to Decide.” Post and Courier. April 20, 2018.
https://www.postandcourier.com/business/was-the-2007-law-that-jumpstarted-s-cnuclear-project-unconstitutional-attorneys-ask-circuit-judge/article_d7eeeaa2-44a5-11e8afe1-93e0bae931e9.html.
Camp, Michael. 2019. Unnatural Resources: Energy and Environmental Politics in Appalachia
after the 1973 Oil Embargo. University of Pittsburgh Press.

71
Carley, Sanya, Sean Nicholson-Crotty, and Chris J. Miller. 2017. “Adoption, Reinvention and
Amendment of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the American States.” Journal of Public
Policy 37 (4): 431–58. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X15000379.
Carlisle, Juliet E., Stephanie L. Kane, David Solan, Madelaine Bowman, and Jeffrey C. Joe.
2015. “Public Attitudes Regarding Large-Scale Solar Energy Development in the U.S.”
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 48 (August): 835–47.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.04.047.
Crumbo, Chuck. "Court input sought on nuke plant - JENKINSVILLE REACTORS." State, The
(Columbia, SC), May 23, 2009: 18. NewsBank: Access World News. https://iwnewsbank-com.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/apps/news/documentview?p=AWNB&docref=news/12860CDCB3808A30.
“Detailed Summary Maps.” Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency. June
2019. https://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/.
“Discussion of South Carolina Act 236: Version 2.0.” 2018. Energy and Environmental
Economics, Inc.
http://energy.sc.gov/files/FINAL%20REPORT%20Act%20236%202.0%2012.20.2018.p
df.
Doblinger, Claudia, and Birthe Soppe. 2013. “Change-Actors in the U.S. Electric Energy
System: The Role of Environmental Groups in Utility Adoption and Diffusion of Wind
Power.” Energy Policy 61 (October): 274–84.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.028.
Dominion Energy. “Dominion Energy Sets New Goal of Net Zero Emissions by 2050.” February
11, 2020. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dominion-energy-sets-new-goalof-net-zero-emissions-by-2050-301002806.html.
Downie, Christian. 2017. “Business Actors, Political Resistance, and Strategies for
Policymakers.” Energy Policy 108 (September): 583–92.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.06.018.
Duke Energy. “Duke Energy Aims to Achieve Net-Zero Carbon Emissions by 2050.” Duke
Energy | News Center. September 17, 2019. https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/dukeenergy-aims-to-achieve-net-zero-carbon-emissions-by-2050.
“Electric Utility Service Areas.” n.d. S.C. Energy Office. Accessed May 3, 2020.
http://energy.sc.gov/node/3071.
“Emerging Energy Issues and North Carolina Trends.” Clean Energy Conservatives. April 3,
2019. https://www.cleanenergyconservatives.com/states/north-carolina/.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, H.R. 776, 102nd Cong. § 2 (1992).

72
Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
Cooper, Governor Roy. “Executive Order No. 80: North Carolina’s Commitment to Address
Climate Change and Transition to a Clean Energy Economy.” October 29, 2018.
https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/EO80%20NC%27s%20Commitment%20to%20Address%20Climate%20Change%20%26%20
Transition%20to%20a%20Clean%20Energy%20Economy.pdf.
“Final Bechtel Report.” 2017. The Post and Courier. September 4, 2017.
https://www.postandcourier.com/final-bechtel-report/pdf_4916a960-91bc-11e7-babbbf257e52714b.html.
Fretwell, Sammy. “A solar ‘doomsday?’ Solar industry faces possible shutdown following PSC
vote”. The State, November 19, 2019a, sec. Environment.
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/environment/article237536009.html.
Fretwell, Sammy. “Santee Cooper cutting jobs at power plants as utility moves to abandon coal”.
The State, August 28, 2019b, sec. Environment.
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/environment/article234395792.html.
Fretwell, Sammy. "Utilities kill solar bill despite majority support in South Carolina House."
State, The (Columbia, SC), April 11, 2018: 1. NewsBank: Access World News.
https://infoweb-newsbank-com.pallas2.tcl.sc.edu/apps/news/documentview?p=AWNB&docref=news/16B3739BA52304E0.
Fu, Ran, David Feldman, and Robert Margolis. 2018. “U.S. Solar Photovoltaic System
Cost Benchmark: Q1 2018.” Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
NREL/TP-6A20-72399. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72399.pdf.
Funkhouser, Erik, Griselda Blackburn, Clare Magee, and Varun Rai. 2015. “Business Model
Innovations for Deploying Distributed Generation: The Emerging Landscape of
Community Solar in the U.S.” Energy Research & Social Science 10 (November): 90–
101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.07.004.
Gaul, Chip, and Sanya Carley. 2012. “Solar Set Asides and Renewable Electricity Certificates:
Early Lessons from North Carolina’s Experience with Its Renewable Portfolio Standard.”
Energy Policy, Special Section: Frontiers of Sustainability, 48 (September): 460–69.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.05.043.
“Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” n.d. City of Charleston Mayor’s Office of Resilience &
Emergency Management. City of Charleston. Accessed May 3, 2020.
https://www.charleston-sc.gov/2311/Greenhouse-Gas-Emissions.
Green, Martin A. 2005. “Silicon Photovoltaic Modules: A Brief History of the First 50 Years.”
Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications 13 (5): 447–55.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pip.612.

73
“Guidelines for Determining the Tax Credit for Investing in Renewable Energy Property.” 2014.
North Carolina Department of Revenue.
https://files.nc.gov/ncdor/documents/administrative-rules/renewable_energy_credits.pdf.
H. 4421, 122nd Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2018).
Imteaz, Monzur Alam, and Amimul Ahsan. 2018. “Solar Panels: Real Efficiencies, Potential
Productions and Payback Periods for Major Australian Cities.” Sustainable Energy
Technologies and Assessments 25 (February): 119–25.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seta.2017.12.007.
Inskeep, Ben. “FERC, States Consider Changes to PURPA.” PV Magazine USA. May 25, 2018.
https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2018/05/25/ferc-states-consider-changes-to-purpa/.
Karapin, Roger. 2020. “Federalism as a Double-Edged Sword: The Slow Energy Transition in
the United States.” The Journal of Environment & Development 29 (1): 26–50.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519886001.
Laws, Nicholas D., Brenden P. Epps, Steven O. Peterson, Mark S. Laser, and G. Kamau
Wanjiru. 2017. “On the Utility Death Spiral and the Impact of Utility Rate Structures on
the Adoption of Residential Solar Photovoltaics and Energy Storage.” Applied Energy
185 (January): 627–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.10.123.
“Maps.” n.d. NC Sustainable Energy Association. Accessed May 2, 2020.
https://energync.org/maps/.
Marlon, Jennifer, Peter Howe, Matto Mildenberger, Anthony Leiserowitz, and Xinran Wang.
“Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2019.” Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.
September 17, 2019. https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycomus/.
Martin, Sharon. “DEQ Secures the Nation’s Largest Coal Ash Excavation of Nearly 80 Million
Tons of Coal Ash.” North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality. January 2,
2020. https://deq.nc.gov/news/press-releases/2020/01/02/deq-securesnation%E2%80%99s-largest-coal-ash-excavation-nearly-80-million.
McCarthy, Justin. “Most Americans Support Reducing Fossil Fuel Use.” Gallup, Inc. March 22,
2019. https://news.gallup.com/poll/248006/americans-support-reducing-fossil-fuel.aspx.
McCarthy, Niall. “Solar Employs More People In U.S. Electricity Generation Than Oil, Coal
And Gas Combined.” Forbes. January 25, 2017.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/01/25/u-s-solar-energy-employs-morepeople-than-oil-coal-and-gas-combined-infographic/.

74
“Merger of Progress Energy and Duke Energy Created Largest U.S. Electric Utility.” U.S.
Energy Information Administration. August 22, 2012.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=7650.
“Mission & Values.” n.d. Office of Regulatory Staff. Accessed May 2, 2020.
https://ors.sc.gov/about-ors/mission-values.
NC Solar Now. “How PURPA Helped Boost Utility-Scale Solar In North Carolina,” August 25,
2016. https://ncsolarnow.com/how-purpa-helped-boost-utility-scale-solar-in-northcarolina/.
“North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System.” 2019.
North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality. https://deq.nc.gov/energyclimate/climate-change/nc-climate-change-interagency-council/climate-change-cleanenergy-16.
“North Carolina Solar.” n.d. Solar Energy Industries Association. Accessed May 2, 2020.
https://www.seia.org/state-solar-policy/north-carolina-solar.
“North Carolina - State Energy Profile.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. October 17,
2019. https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=NC.
North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association. “Before the North Carolina Utilities
Commission, Docket No. E-100, Sub 83. Motion for Disclosure and Equitable Relief.”
February 24, 2014. https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=35273c58-5d84454a-a38e-43510a65ab84.
North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-100, Sub 83. “Order Adopting Net
Metering.” October 20, 2005.
https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=766d7127-977d-4312-a98ce2fc6fa09742.
North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-100, Sub 83. “Order Amending Net
Metering Policy.” March 31, 2009.
https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=f1b29a03-4445-4930-9dfd14682ceb368e.
North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-100, Sub 83. “Order Initiating Investigation
and Requesting Comments.” November 18, 1998.
https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=bafefcff-d715-4a0a-950c475cfbc4d529.
North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. E-100, Sub 83. “Order Scheduling Public
Hearings.” July 8, 1999. https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d3168c24fb55-45a0-a9a7-7ef5a5eeac51.

75
Nunez, Christina. “Can Natural Gas Be a Bridge to Clean Energy?” 2014. National Geographic.
March 20, 2014. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/energy/great-energychallenge/big-energy-question/can-natural-gas-be-a-bridge-to-clean-energy/.
Ouzts, Elizabeth. “Duke Energy Rewards, Punishes N.C. Lawmakers over Ratemaking Bill.”
Energy News Network. March 25, 2020.
https://energynews.us/2020/03/25/southeast/duke-energy-rewards-punishes-n-clawmakers-over-ratemaking-bill/.
Pollard, Trey. “New Poll in NC Shows Concern For Coal Ash, Call for Strong Regulations.”
Sierra Club National. March 25, 2014. https://content.sierraclub.org/pressreleases/2014/03/new-poll-nc-shows-concern-coal-ash-call-strong-regulations.
Prontera, Andrea. 2009. “Energy Policy: Concepts, Actors, Instruments and Recent
Developments.” World Political Science 5 (1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-6226.1063.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 80-251-E, Order No. 81-214. “Order
Implementing PURPA.” March 20, 1981.
https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Order/18489e02-aeed-ba47-3b0eee8d5d06c0e6.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 80-251-E, Order No. 82-58. “Order
Pursuant to Order.” February 1, 1982.
https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Order/db6388d8-f3d2-c926-52b773d85c4f52dd.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 80-251-E, Order No. 85-347.
“Order.” August 2, 1985. https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Order/1781e7b8-cd256730-06c9f8c0489028cb.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 80-251-E, Order No. 89-56. “Order.”
February 8, 1989. https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Order/9accf67a-ebd0-06a900bc971265b96d9b.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2014-246-E, Order No. 2015-194.
“Order on Net Metering and Approving Settlement Agreement.” March 20, 2015.
https://dms.psc.sc.gov/attachments/order/29CF4369-155D-141F-23B1536C046AEBC5.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2019-184-E, Commission Directive.
“South Carolina Energy Freedom Act (H.3659) Proceeding to Establish Dominion
Energy South Carolina, Incorporated's Standard Offer, Avoided Cost Methodologies,
Form Contract Power Purchase Agreements, Commitment to Sell Forms, and Any Other
Terms or Conditions Necessary.” November 15, 2019a.
https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Matter/2e0705e6-9cfe-4783-bbcc-0a4c07fcdc56.

76
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2019-184-E, Commission Directive.
“South Carolina Energy Freedom Act (H.3659) Proceeding to Establish Dominion
Energy South Carolina, Incorporated's Standard Offer, Avoided Cost Methodologies,
Form Contract Power Purchase Agreements, Commitment to Sell Forms, and Any Other
Terms or Conditions Necessary.” January 3, 2020.
https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Matter/44286ddc-e1c5-4884-8ff0-fac911d67c4b.
Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Docket No. 2019-185-E, Commission Directive.
“- South Carolina Energy Freedom Act (H.3659) Proceeding to Establish Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC's Standard Offer, Avoided Cost Methodologies, Form Contract Power
Purchase Agreements, Commitment to Sell Forms, and Any Other Terms or Conditions
Necessary.” November 15, 2019b. https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Matter/f9205af9fdf1-40ed-afc4-c00c348659ad.
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, H.R. 4018, 95th Cong. § 2 (1978).
Ruhl, Laura, Avner Vengosh, Gary S. Dwyer, Heileen Hsu-Kim, Amrika Deonarine, Mike
Bergin, and Julia Kravchenko. 2009. “Survey of the Potential Environmental and Health
Impacts in the Immediate Aftermath of the Coal Ash Spill in Kingston, Tennessee.”
Environmental Science & Technology 43 (16): 6326–33.
https://doi.org/10.1021/es900714p.
Sanders, Jon. “Reforming PURPA Energy Contracts.” John Locke Foundation. June 6, 2017.
https://www.johnlocke.org/research/reforming-purpa-energy-contracts/.
Sarzynski, Andrea, Jeremy Larrieu, and Gireesh Shrimali. 2012. “The Impact of State Financial
Incentives on Market Deployment of Solar Technology.” Energy Policy 46 (July): 550–
57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.032.
Schelly, Chelsea, Edward P. Louie, and Joshua M. Pearce. 2017. “Examining Interconnection
and Net Metering Policy for Distributed Generation in the United States.” Renewable
Energy Focus 22–23 (December): 10–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ref.2017.09.002.
Sengupta, Manajit, Yu Xie, Anthony Lopez, Aron Habte, Galen Maclaurin, and James Shelby.
2018. “The National Solar Radiation Data Base (NSRDB).” Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews 89 (June): 51–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.03.003.
Session Law 1999-342, H.B. 1472, 1999-2000 Sess. § 1 (N.C. 1999).
Session Law 2007-397, S. 3, 2007-2008 Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2007).
Session Law 2015-11, S. 372, 2015-2016 Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2015).
Session Law 2017-192, H.B. 589, 2017-2018 Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2017).

77
“Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC).” n.d. Solar Energy Industries Association. Accessed May 2,
2020. https://www.seia.org/initiatives/solar-investment-tax-credit-itc.
“South Carolina Clean Energy Survey.” South Carolina – Conservatives for Clean Energy.
March 13, 2019. https://www.cleanenergyconservatives.com/states/south-carolina/.
“South Carolina Solar.” n.d. Solar Energy Industries Association. Accessed May 2, 2020.
https://www.seia.org/state-solar-policy/south-carolina-solar.
“South Carolina - State Energy Profile.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. October 17,
2019. https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=SC.
Stoutenborough, James W., and Matthew Beverlin. 2008. “Encouraging Pollution-Free Energy:
The Diffusion of State Net Metering Policies*.” Social Science Quarterly 89 (5): 1230–
51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2008.00571.
Sukunta, Manussawee. “North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar Facilities than Any
Other State.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 23, 2016.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27632.
“S.C. Energy Office.” n.d. South Carolina Energy Office. Accessed May 2, 2020.
http://www.energy.sc.gov/.
The Editorial Board. “Opinion | Regulatory Favoritism in North Carolina.” The New York
Times, February 16, 2014, sec. Opinion.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/opinion/regulatory-favoritism-in-northcarolina.html.
“Top 10 Solar States.” n.d. Solar Energy Industries Association. Accessed May 2, 2020.
https://www.seia.org/research-resources/top-10-solar-states-0.
Trabish, Herman K. 2014. “Is South Carolina Solar about to Explode?” Utility Dive. November
18, 2014. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/is-south-carolina-solar-about-toexplode/334164/.
United States Environmental Protection Agency. “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009: A Guide to Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Opportunities for Local and
Tribal Governments.” Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2009.
https://archive.epa.gov/recovery/web/pdf/local_guide_to_arra.pdf.
U.S. Energy Information Administration – Office of Energy Analysis. “Annual Energy Outlook
2020”. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2020.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/index.php.
“U.S. Energy Mapping System.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. n.d. Accessed May 2,
2020. https://www.eia.gov/state/maps.php?v=Solar.

78
“UN Climate Change Annual Report 2018.” 2018. United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UN-Climate-ChangeAnnual-Report-2018.pdf.
Walton, Robert. “South Carolina Utilities Debate V.C. Summer Fate as 6-Week Deadline
Looms.” Utility Dive. November 21, 2017. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/southcarolina-utilities-debate-vc-summer-fate-as-6-week-deadline-looms/511415/.
Wiedman, Joseph, Thad Culley, Laurel Varnado, and Rosalind Jackson. “Freeing the Grid 2012:
Best Practices in State Net Metering Policies and Interconnection Procedures.” Interstate
Renewable Energy Council (IREC) | The Vote Solar Initiative.
https://cleanenergysolutions.org/zh-hans/resources/freeing-grid-2012-best-practices-statenet-metering-policies-interconnection-procedures.
Wilks, Avery G. “SC Senate votes to repeal 2007 law that set stage for VC Summer nuclear
fiasco.” The State, May 10, 2018, sec. Politics and Government.
https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article210692104.html.
Wines, Michael, and Richard Fausset. “North Carolina’s Legislative Maps Are Thrown Out by
State Court Panel.” The New York Times, September 3, 2019, sec. U.S.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/us/north-carolina-gerrymanderunconstitutional.html.
“2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Results by State and County.” n.d. Accessed May 2, 2020.
http://www.biostat.umn.edu/~greg-g/election.html.

